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Executive Summary 
 
This report presents the findings of research commissioned by the Northern Ireland 
Community Relations Council into social media, parades and protests. The aim of the 
research was to explore how social media sites are being used in relation to both 
parades and protests and what impact this is having on communities.  
This research involved four separate approaches to the area of interest. In the initial 
stages of project, a review of the literature in the area was carried out. Secondly, a 
series of one to one interviews were conducted with community workers, band 
members, members of the Loyal Orders, representatives of statutory agencies, and 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Thirdly, focus groups were conducted 
with bands from both rural and urban areas of Northern Ireland. Finally, Twitter 
activity relating to parades and protests were monitored between 11th and 14th July 
2014.  
This research found that social media is perceived as being a positive feature of 
communication in relation to parades and protests for a number of reasons: 
 Social media sites were described as empowering individuals and groups to 
communicate their perspectives on issues, as well as ensuring these views 
were heard by a wider audience, effectively giving many “a voice”; 
 It was described as at times providing a semblance of a “safe space” or 
distance for individuals and groups to express their views on what may be 
viewed as emotive issues (such as parading and protests). This was 
described as creating opportunities to hear alternative views and positions on 
these issues that may have not been available in an “offline” context; and 
 A key positive for those living in contested spaces such as interface areas, as 
well as the PSNI, was that the sites afford the opportunity to counteract 
counteract rumours and misinformation during controversial marches and 
protests on a large and far reaching scale thus countering potential negative 
repercussions at the community level; 
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The negative impact of social media was also detailed and included: 
 The instantaneous nature of reactions it facilitates and how emotive these can 
be. The resulting reaction to such expressions of views were viewed as being 
potentially detrimental to inter-communal relations in certain areas; 
 There was a recognition that social media is used to spread false information 
and rumours and this is resulting in an increase in both inter-communal 
tensions and fear within communities; and 
 Social media was described as vilifying protestors and those engaging in 
parading practices in that it was viewed as distorting their narratives. 
This research also engaged with a range of statutory agencies working with groups 
and individuals in relation to parades and protests. Key findings included: 
 The majority of statutory agencies are actively avoiding engaging with social 
media in meaningful way. This was attributed to a perception that it has the 
potential to harm relationships between communities and the agencies 
themselves. Other agencies simply felt that their work meant that they could 
simply not be seen to engage with public discussions on particular protests or 
parades; 
 Those who are using it are mindfully using it to enable them to act as a 
conduit between the various “levels”, for example “grassroots” based groups 
and government; and 
 There was a view that there needs to be substantial dedicated resourcing for 
social media to enable groups and agencies to use it effectively in their work. 
For the most part, this is currently lacking and as such many agencies feel 
their engagement with communities via social media is curtailed as a result. 
The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) also engaged with this research and 
emphasised the following areas in relation to social media, parades and protests: 
 Social media has become a central feature of the community engagement 
strategy of the PSNI in that it facilitates communication between the service 
and communities who have been traditionally disengaged from policing in 
Northern Ireland;  
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 It is also increasing the transparency of the policing of both parades and 
protests in Northern Ireland in that and requires the PSNI to be answerable 
on accessible platforms such as Facebook and Twitter; 
 While PSNI representatives acknowledged that social media is often the 
source of misinformation and rumours in relation to parades and protests, it 
also affords them the opportunity to provide accurate information in these 
situations.  
A number of themes emerged from the analysis of Twitter activity during the Twelfth:  
 The Orange Order, and its supporters, highlighted the positive experiences of 
those who attended these parades through the innovative use of hashtags 
such as #twelthieselfie;  
 The users that contributed to the Twelfth hashtags tended to be full of praise 
for the peaceful and non-violent conduct of the Orange Order. In particular, 
there was much support for its ‘graduated response’ to the Parade 
Commission’s decision to ban the return leg of the Ligoniel Orange lodges 
from passing by the Ardoyne shops; 
 Twitter provided users with an array of information sources courtesy of the 
citizen and professional journalists who were tweeting their perspectives on 
events as they unfolded. The latter were more influential in these information 
flows, primarily due to the high number of retweets for content produced by 
journalists from BBC NI and UTV;  
 Citizens were quick to check the veracity of the reports emerging from the 
scene. There were also several examples of citizens using the site to refute 
rumours and expose those responsible for photoshopping images, as was 
seen with the Randalstown bonfire and the picture of a protester in Ardoyne; 
 The relatively short lifespan of these rumours, not to mention the lack of 
media coverage they received, illustrated how effectively tweeters corrected 
misinformation during this period; and  
 While acknowledging that social media has often been used to reinforce 
divisions between rival communities in Northern Ireland, the study suggested 
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Twitter facilitates modes of communication that have the potential to diffuse 
sectarian tensions around the marching season.  
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Recommendations 
 
The following are recommendations based on our research findings outlined in this 
report: 
 Social media had been harnessed by some individuals and groups in a 
manner to challenge what they perceived as the negative and inaccurate 
portrayals of protests and parades. This reveals the potential for social media 
to be harnessed as an empowering tool for communities, groups and 
individuals in how they are being represented; 
 Social media was described as having the potential to be a powerful tool for 
education. This was also relevant to both parades and protests, and in 
particular the Loyal Orders who viewed as a mechanism to develop mutual 
understanding.  However, this was described as being on ad hoc basis, and 
requires a more formalised approach in terms of training and awareness 
raising on the potential for social media for organisations, groups and 
individuals engaging in parades and protests;  and 
 Reflecting the findings of previous research, there is still a need for training on 
the impact of the immediacy of social media and how this can adversely affect 
inter-communal relations. The issue of rumours in relation to specific parades 
and protests are still impacting perceptions of these events. There is a need 
to provide groups and individuals with knowledge on the online mechanisms 
to counter false information and reduce the harmful impact of rumours. 
Statutory agencies 
 This research revealed that statutory agencies are all taking different 
approaches to social media, particularly in relation to parades and protests. 
While some agencies and groups are utilising social media as a mechanism 
to engage with communities, others are completely avoiding it. There is a 
need for a joint up approach to the use of social media in relation to parades 
and protests.   
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 The lack of resourcing for social media as a tool for engaging communities is 
currently limiting many of the organisations and agencies in how they are 
using it. While social media is not the only communication tool for these 
organisations and agencies, it is nonetheless an important aspect of ensuring 
that “linking” social capital is developed and maintained;  
 The nature of the use of social media was also inconsistent across various 
agencies with some of them neglecting or avoiding social media altogether 
due to a concern about its use in terms of protecting organisations. There 
needs to be training for staff of these agencies to ensure that social media is 
used and employed in an effective manner; 
 It is clear from this research that communities, groups and individuals want 
positive messages about work engaging with parades and protests to be 
disseminated through social media by statutory agencies and organisations. 
However, at present, it is viewed that these agencies are reluctant to do this 
and that this use of social media needs to be developed and applied. 
Policing 
 This research evidenced the centrality of social media to current community 
policing strategies. There are opportunities for this to be further developed 
and to be part of the wider policing approach throughout Northern Ireland; 
 There is evidence that social media is currently being used by the police to 
counter harmful narratives about parades and protests. This approach could 
be actively promoted by the police and adopted by other sectors to ensure 
positive engagement with parades and protests; 
 Social media is increasing the transparency of policing in relation to parades 
and protests. The dissemination of videos and images of policing in public 
order situations means that the police are more accountable in how they are 
policing these events. This is already being embraced by the PSNI, who have 
engaged with complaints over social media and should continue to be a key 
feature of their online strategy; and 
 Social media is a key feature of community engagement particularly in relation 
to parades and protests, while also requiring significant resources. This 
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research evidences the importance of continuing this approach and ensuring 
that it is developed on despite budgetary restrictions.  
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Part 1. Social Media, Parades and Protests: 
An Introduction 
 
Recent events in Northern Ireland have demonstrated the power of social media in 
relation to the nature of parades and protest in Northern Ireland. Protests in the wake 
of the decision by Belfast City Council in December 2012 to alter the protocol on the 
number of days the Union Flag flies at Belfast City Hall were often organised over 
social media sites. In addition to this, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were used to 
express views and to share eyewitness perspectives on both the protests and the 
violence witnessed in the most intense period of protest between December 2012 
and January 2013. Much of the media attention focused on the integral role of 
Facebook in the organisation of what became referred to colloquially as “the flag 
protests”. Facebook pages such as Save Our Union Flag functioned as spaces over 
which Loyalist flag protesters could not only share information on upcoming 
demonstrations but also discuss related issues such as allegations of police heavy-
handedness in policing the protests, particularly in east Belfast.1 Similarly, when 
sectarian remarks were made about the Catholic residents of Short Strand in the 
wake of the violence seen in east Belfast in January 2013, they were reported to 
Facebook and the page administrators were forced to remind users that offensive 
remarks would be deleted. A number of cases, including the enforced removal of two 
Facebook pages after the posting of threats against an unidentified Catholic man, led 
Justice Minister David Ford to call on the PSNI to gather information about those 
who posted “hate speech” or incited others to committing criminal offences.2  
In the period since these protests, and particularly since July 2013, loyalist bands 
have been a central focus and key instigators of both parades and protests in 
relation to Ardoyne/Twaddell Avenue interface area of North Belfast. Loyalist 
protests against the Northern Ireland Parades Commission’s decision to ban the 
return leg of an Orange Order parade from going past the Ardoyne shops in North 
Belfast lead to violent clashes with the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in 
                                                            
1 “Facebook didn’t start the flag riots”  
22 February 2013. (http://leicesterexchanges.com/2013/02/22/facebook‐didnt‐start‐the‐flag‐riots/) 
2 “Flag protests: Loyalty no excuse for violence, says police chief”.  BBC, 12 December 2012. 
 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‐northern‐ireland‐20622185) 
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July 2013. A loyalist “peace camp” was setup in nearby Twaddell Avenue, with 
nightly parades held in protest at the decision. These ongoing protests have been 
heavily criticised for elevating sectarian tensions in this contested interface areas 
and for the estimated cost of £9 million for policing the operation over a nine month 
period.3 Like the Union Flag related protests, they have been also been the focus of 
much debate and discussion on social media sites. Other recent events have also 
placed emphasis on the role of bands in protests in Northern Ireland and bands from 
Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist communities have been described as having “gained a 
new prominence” as a direct result of a YouTube video of one band marching in 
circles outside a Catholic church in North Belfast that “went viral”.4 This incident 
involved the Shankill Road-based Young Conway Volunteers being filmed walking in 
circles, apparently playing prohibited music outside St Patrick’s Catholic church in 
Donegall Street, Belfast. 
Controversial parades and protests have also had an adverse impact upon 
community relations in rural contexts. The Tyrone Volunteers Day Parade in 
Castlederg on 11 August 2013, which commemorated Republican paramilitaries 
killed during the Troubles, faced much criticism from both unionist politicians and 
victims’ groups.5 The latter would organise a counter-demonstration to coincide with 
the parade passing through the centre of the Tyrone market town. While the parade 
passed off largely without incident, there was much debate in relation to both its 
legitimacy and the decision of the Northern Ireland Parades Commission to allow it 
to proceed (albeit with some restrictions and via a different route than planned by the 
organisers) on social media sites such as Twitter and blogs such as Slugger 
O’Toole.6 There was also much discussion about the broader issues of victimhood 
and reconciliation in these online spaces. Despite this focus, little consideration has 
                                                            
3 “Loyalist Twaddell protest camp policing bill  tops £9 million: 10‐month operation  in north Belfast”, Belfast 
Telegraph, 19 May 2014.  
(http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local‐national/northern‐ireland/loyalist‐twaddell‐protest‐camp‐
policing‐bill‐tops‐9‐million‐10month‐operation‐in‐north‐belfast‐30286135.html) 
4 See: M. Hall. Towards a Shared Future (5) Ulster’s Marching bands. (Belfast, NICRC: 2014), 3.  
5 “Northern  Ireland  parade  to  commemorate  IRA  men  chills  atmosphere  in  Castlederg”.  The  Guardian,  2 
August 2013.  
(http://www.theguardian.com/uk‐news/blog/2013/aug/02/ira‐men‐northern‐ireland‐parade‐castlederg).  
6  “Republican  Castlederg  parade:  the  insensitivity  of  the  impotent”.  July  31  2013 
(http://sluggerotoole.com/2013/07/31/republican‐castlederg‐parade‐the‐insensitivity‐of‐the‐
impotent/comment‐page‐1/) 
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been given to the impact of social media on debate, discussion and representation of 
parades and protests in Northern Ireland. Therefore, it is necessary to assess how 
these online interactions both reflect and influence the nature of relations ‘on the 
ground’ in both rural and urban contexts.  
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Context 
 
Statistics show that the number of parades held in Northern Ireland has nearly 
doubled over the past decade (from 2,120 in 2005 and 4,637 in 2013).7 In 2011, it 
was estimated that there were approximately 700 active bands in the region, the vast 
majority of which identify as Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist. 8  Groups such as the 
Orange Order and the Ancient Order of Hibernians are amongst the most well-known 
of the institutions in the region which are involved in parades. Northern Ireland has 
been described as having a politically sensitive parading season, with most marches 
taking place between the months of March and September.9 Casserly asserts that 
the parading tradition is generally perceived as “a manifestation of the communal 
divisions between Catholic and Protestant groups”.10 Indeed, many Loyalist bands 
were actively involved in the high-profile political demonstrations against the Anglo 
Irish Agreement in 1985, which brought them into conflict with nationalists and the 
state security forces.11 Band members were active participants in the demonstrations 
that followed the dispute at Drumcree in 1996. Ramsay describes how “this 
sometimes led them into confrontation with nationalists and with state security forces 
and the Orange Order frequently blamed the bands for trouble at such events”.12 It is 
important not only to emphasise that parading culture/s encompass practices and 
networks which go beyond such negative representations, but also to unpack the 
perception of parading as de facto a contentious issue. Only a small proportion of 
these parades have proven to be controversial, with the then Chair of the Northern 
Ireland Parades Commission, Peter Osborne, stating that “just 225 of the total of 
4,500 were deemed contentious or sensitive in 2012-2013”. Contrary to media 
reports on parades that emphasise their polarising effects in the contested spaces of 
interface areas, these statistics suggest that the vast majority of these 
                                                            
7 P.  Nolan.  Northern  Ireland  Peace  Monitoring  Report  3.  Belfast:  Northern  Ireland  Community  Relations 
Council. (2014), 157. 
8 G. Ramsey, “Band Practice: Class, Taste and Identity in Ulster Loyalist Flute Bands. Ethnomusicology Ireland 1, 
(2011).  
9 R Casserly. “Blood, Thunder and Drums: Style and Changing Aesthetic in Ulster Protestant Bands”. Yearbook 
for Traditional Music. Vol. 45. (2013), 143. 
10 R. Casserly. “Blood, Thunder and Drums: Style and Changing Aesthetic in Ulster Protestant Bands”. Yearbook 
for Traditional Music. Vol. 45. (2013), 143. 
11 G. Ramsey, Band Practice: Class, Taste and Identity in Ulster Loyalist Flute Bands. Ethnomusicology (2011), 2. 
 
14 
 
demonstrations pass off without any incidents of inter-communal violence. Even so, 
it remains important for community leaders and policy-makers to consider new 
approaches towards the improvement of community relations in the context of 
seemingly controversial parades in contested areas such as North Belfast. Hence, 
this project examines the potential role of social media in generating positive 
interactions between communities in such areas during the marching season. 
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Social Media and the Flag Protests in Northern Ireland 
 
The protests seen in the Twaddell/Ardoyne interface in north Belfast since July 2013 
may be viewed as a continuation of the flag protests, which first occurred in 
December 2012 in the aftermath of Belfast City Council’s decision to change the 
policy on the number of days the Union Flag flies at Belfast City Hall. Recent 
research characterised events associated with the flags dispute in the following 
ways:  
 On a number of evenings there were co-ordinated street protests which often 
resulted in roads being blocked for a short period of time; 
 Peaceful protests involving large sections of the community;  
 The picketing of Alliance Party offices; 
 Attacks made against property associated with the Alliance Party; 
 Threats made against Alliance Party members; 
 Saturday marches to Belfast City Hall and subsequent protest; 
 Street disturbances and rioting between protestors and the PSNI; 
 Severe criticisms of the policing of the protests from the nationalist 
community; 
 A deterioration in the relationship between loyalists and the PSNI; 
 Confusion around what constituted a peaceful and legal protests; and 
 Injured police officers and significant numbers of arrests.13  
 
It is interesting to note that this study made little reference to the role of social media 
in the flag dispute. However, statistics obtained on the number of online incidents 
reported to the police in the period between 2012 and 2013 suggest that social 
media played a fundamental role in the nature of communication during this period. 
Data released by the PSNI under the Freedom of Information Act showed that 2887 
incidents involving either Facebook or Twitter were reported to the police in 2012.14 
In the first five and half months of 2013, there were 2,111 social media incidents 
                                                            
13 Intercomm  and  J.  Byrne.  Flags  and  Protests:  Exploring  the  views,  perceptions  and  experiences  of  people 
directly and indirectly affected by the flag protests. (Belfast:Intercomm, 2014), 3. 
14 Information  accessed  at  http://www.brianjohnspencer.com/2887‐social‐media‐offences‐reported‐to‐psni‐
in‐ 2012/  
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reported to the PSNI, with 229 of these being reported during the peak of the flag 
protests in January and the first half of February. This increase in the number of 
online incidents being reported to the police may be one manifestation of the 
protests in relation to contentious parades and the flag dispute that were so 
prominent during this period. 15  However, it should be noted that no specific 
information is available on the type of abuse that was reported. Conceivably, these 
might include a range of offences including online fraud, cyber-stalking and the 
posting of offensive and abusive messages online. Recent research has suggested 
that social media not only provided people with information about the flag protests 
but also functioned as a space in which they could express their views on its 
rationale.16  Furthermore, many participants expressed the view that the protests 
would not have gained nearly as much traction with protesters, had social media not 
existed.17 This study will interrogate this finding further in order to explore the impact 
of social media more generally, upon the experiences of those directly involved in 
parades and related protests in Northern Ireland.  
Social media has been identified as a key tool for the organisation and promotion of 
mass demonstrations in a variety of democratic and non-democratic countries since 
January 2011, including Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey and the United States.18 Castells 
views such developments as indicative of the “counter-power” afforded to social 
movements through their use of autonomous communication networks in both on 
and offline contexts. Evidence in favour of this optimistic view of technology as an 
agent of protest can arguably be found in the so-called ‘Twitter Revolution’ in Iran in 
2009. The microblogging site first rose to international prominence in this capacity 
when it was used to share images and eyewitness perspectives on the unrest that 
followed allegations of election fraud made against incumbent Iranian President 
                                                            
15 These statistics and information are available in an article by Brian John Spencer “Expect to “have your collar 
felt”  if you break  the  law” Accessed at http://eamonnmallie.com/2013/08/psni‐continues‐to‐see‐rise‐in‐the‐
number‐of‐ social‐media‐incidents‐2/ on August 30, 2013. 
16 O. Young,  “New Media and Young People  in  Interface Areas of Belfast”, Shared Space, 14  (Belfast:NICRC, 
2014), 77  
17O. Young,  “New Media and Young People  in  Interface Areas of Belfast”,  Shared Space, 14  (Belfast:NICRC, 
2014), 78 
18 United States  Institute of Peace  (2010). “Blogs and Bullets: Understanding Online Discourse as a Cause of 
Conflict and Means of Dialogue”.  [WWW] 
<URL: http://www.usip.org/programs/initiatives/blogs‐bullets [Accessed 15 March 2014] 
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Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during elections held in June 2009”.19 Similarly, the impetus 
for the “Occupy Wall Street” movement was linked to a blogpost that called on 
supporters to “#OccupyWallStreet”. However, it has also been argued that the use of 
sites such as Facebook and Twitter for the organisation of protests may prove 
detrimental for protest movements, insofar as it may make it easier for governments 
to identify and arrest their leaders.20  
During the flag protests in Northern Ireland in January 2013, social media was used 
as both a tool to organise street protests against the Belfast City Council decision 
and a means for citizens to register their dissatisfaction with the protesters 
themselves. Hashtags such as #takebackthecity and #loveBelfast were used to 
encourage local people to support businesses in Belfast that suffered a massive 
downturn in trade due to the period of protests. However, probably the most notable 
trend during this period was the content posted on Loyalist parody social media 
pages, such as Loyalists Against Democracy (L.A.D). The L.A.D Facebook and 
Twitter accounts were used to share sectarian comments posted on Loyalist flag 
protest pages on Facebook during this period. Supporters have hailed L.A.D for 
“holding up a mirror” to those loyalists who were articulating their views via social 
media.21 However, those individuals responsible for L.A.D have also been accused 
of perpetuating class-based stereotypes of Loyalist communities. The Protestant 
Coalition, as well as prominent loyalists such as Jamie Bryson, have used both 
Facebook and Twitter to challenge the commentary provided by L.A.D, leading to 
some hostile exchanges on these sites. Similarly, there were also debates between 
bloggers who took different positions not only on the rationale for the protests but 
also on the loyalist tropes shared by L.A.D.22 In this way, social media has appeared 
to reinforce the ‘zero-sum’ perception of politics held by many communities within 
Northern Ireland.  
Clearly, there was a disparity between those people who expressed support for the 
flag protests on Facebook and Twitter and the relatively small number of protesters 
                                                            
19 P. Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets. Social Media and Contemporary Activism, (London: Pluto Press,2012), 
48. 
20 E. Morozov, The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate The World. (London: Penguin, 2012). 
21  B.  Spencer  (2013)  Loyalists  Against  Democracy‐  Unveiling  and  Assailing  Sectarianism, 
http://eamonnmallie.com/2013/10/loyalists‐against‐democracy‐unveiling‐and‐assailing‐sectarianism/ 
22 See:  www.dgmagee.wordpress.com and www.brianjohnspencer.com 
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who have continued to hold weekly demonstrations outside Belfast City Hall since 
January 2013. The term “clicktivism” has been employed to describe the practice of 
showing support on social media platforms (such as ‘liking’ specific Facebook pages 
or ‘re-tweeting’ on Twitter) while not directly engaging in more traditional, physical 
forms of protest, such as participating in mass public demonstrations.23 A similar 
term, “slacktivism”, has been employed to describe those who engage in what 
Morozov has described as “civic promiscuity”.24 He argues that while online activists 
feel a sense of self-worth through such engagement with online campaigns much of 
this activity is unlikely to generate significant political change. Bennett goes as far as 
to suggest that these practices are emblematic of a new type of “lifestyle politics” 
which is ultimately built on “weak ties” rather than any complex ideological 
foundation. 25  Recent work by Tufekci and others has suggested that these 
weaknesses of online activism have been over-stated, with slacktivism perhaps 
better understood as an important intervention in an “attention ecology” that 
encompasses both “old” and “new” media platforms.26 Nevertheless, there remains 
concern amongst some commentators that direct forms of political participation, such 
as voting, might be undermined by the prevalence of social media campaigns that 
urge supporters to ‘like’ or ‘follow’ their online content rather than engage in physical 
forms of protest.27 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
23 M. White, “Clicktivism is Ruining Leftist Activism”, The Guardian.  
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/12/clicktivism‐ruining‐leftist‐activism)  
24 E. Morozov, The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate The World. (London: Penguin, 2012), 190. 
25 W.L. Bennett, “The UnCivic Culture: Communication,  Identity and the rise of Lifestyle Politics”, PS: Political 
Science & Politics, December 1998, 741‐761.  
26 Z.Tufekci “Not This One: Social movements, the attention economy, and Microcelebrity Networked 
Activism, American Behavioral Scientist, (2013) originally published online 26 March 2013 DOI: 
10.1177/0002764213479369 
27 M.Gladwell. Small Change: Why the Revolution will not be tweeted, The New Yorker, October 4, 2010: Available at: 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell  
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Social Media and Inter-Group Contact in Northern Ireland 
 
Social media has also been linked to the spread of “networked individualism”. This 
concept was developed by sociologist Barry Wellman to describe how technology 
enables networked individuals to move within a new “operating system” that lies 
outside traditional structures such as the family and institutions embedded within 
local communities.28 Sites such as Facebook afford people the opportunity to form 
social connections and share information with geographically dispersed members of 
online communities. 29  The resulting online networks “help calibrate interpersonal 
relationships by establishing levels of transparency, privacy, security and inter-
personal trust”.30  However, such networks by their nature are not static in their 
composition and do not adhere to set formations. They are able to adapt to changing 
situations “across geographic and temporal boundaries”.31 Distinctions have been 
made between connective and collective action that further enhance our 
understanding of the nature of offline networks, which are effectively reconfigured 
online. While collective action involves getting individuals to contribute to or agitate 
for a common cause, connective action sees individuals ‘opt-in’ to certain campaigns 
that include like-minded groups and individuals.32 Bennett and Segerberg identify the 
latter as encompassing various practices including ‘sharing’ on Facebook and 
commenting on YouTube, and linking to content via Twitter.33 These are important 
points in the wider context of this research, given that protest in Northern Ireland 
appears to involve both collective and connective forms of action.  
                                                            
28 H. Rheingold, Net Smart. How to Thrive Online. (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2012), 192. 
29 B. Wellman et al. “The social affordances of the Internet for networked individualism”. .Journal of Computer 
Mediated Communication. 2003, 8(3) 
30 W.L. Bennett  and A.  Segerberg,    ‘The  logic of  connective  action‘,  Information, Communication &  Society, 
(2012) 15:5, 739‐768, 753 
31 W.L. Bennett  and A.  Segerberg,    ‘The  logic of  connective  action‘,  Information, Communication &  Society, 
(2012) 15:5, 739‐768, 753. 
32 W.L. Bennett  and A.  Segerberg,    ‘The  logic of  connective  action‘,  Information, Communication &  Society, 
(2012) 15:5, 739‐768, 749. 
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Social media may have the potential to enable new patterns of social interaction and 
‘make new forms of sociality possible’.34 In the context of Northern Ireland, this might 
lead to the transformation of inter-community relations in divided areas such as the 
Ardoyne/Twaddell Avenue interface in North Belfast. The contact hypothesis, first 
articulated by Allport (1954), suggests that under the right conditions interaction 
between members of different groups can reduce negative stereotyping of outgroups 
in divided societies. Although this theory underpins the majority of community 
relations work in Northern Ireland, it has been subject to much debate and critique. 
In particular, the potential role of new media in the countering of negative 
stereotyping of the ‘other’ has been described as utopian. 35  Indeed, one study 
suggested that the Internet reinforced the competition of victimhood between rival 
residents’ groups in Northern Ireland, with the prospects for improved inter-
community relations unlikely to be enhanced through their respective website 
strategies.36 Reilly (2012) asserts that it may be more appropriate for community 
groups in interface areas to “conceptualise on-line contact as just one stage in a 
process that leads to richer contact capable of reducing prejudices against members 
of rival communities”.37 It has also been suggested that online interactions might 
reinforce existing divisions and patterns of street violence between rival communities 
in Northern Ireland38, with social media often said to have played a key role in the 
organisation of anti-social behaviour and street riots in interface areas.39 In some 
areas, sites such as Facebook have been identified as key tools in the orchestration 
of ‘pitch battles’ between young people from loyalist and republican communities.40 
Rather than enlarging or diversifying the social networks of individuals, these sites 
may in fact limit them. Gerbaudo uses Bourdieu’s concept of “elective affinities” to 
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explain how new media often results in individuals effectively self-selecting 
themselves into like-minded social circles.41 In practice, the structure of sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter makes it relatively easy for people to search for like-minded 
groups and individuals. This is pertinent to Northern Ireland, where ‘single identity’ 
patterns of social and political engagement have been said to have reinforced and 
even encouraged sectarian divisions.  
Nevertheless, online networks, which are based on mutual interests, may have 
benefits for communities affected by parades and protests in Northern Ireland, 
particularly in relation to event coordination and information sharing. Gerbaudo 
asserts that social media provide such groups with the “choreography of assembly” 
enabling activist groups to tap into both the personal and cultural symbols of the 
individual. However, online networks are likely to remain a fundamental pre-requisite 
for effective protest campaigns. Bennett and Segerberg suggest that such networks 
“help calibrate relationships by establishing levels of transparency, privacy, security 
and inter-personal trust”.42 This study will explore these issues in the context of 
bands and local communities, which already demonstrate these qualities in the 
offline world. In this way, it will provide further evidence in relation to the potential 
role of social media in fostering positive intergroup contact in contested areas of 
Northern Ireland.  
The reproduction of offline social networks in online spaces brings into focus the 
relationship between online behaviour and social capital. The concept of social 
capital has become synonymous with Robert Putnam, who uses the term to refer to 
the “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks, than can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”.43 He suggests 
that this may take the form of either ‘bonding’ or ‘bridging’ social capital. The former 
refers to intra group networks and relationships and the latter to inter group networks 
and relationships. Previous research has tended to suggest an overall positive 
relationship between internet use and political engagement,44 with some indications 
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that the use of social media sites might be linked to the creation of social capital. For 
example, a study conducted involving college students in the United States identified 
a positive correlation between Facebook use and all forms of social capital amongst 
its participants, including ‘linking’ capital with those in positions of power.45 This 
research not only explored the nature of social capital in relation to individuals and 
groups, but also between citizens and those in positions of power, i.e. “linking” social 
capital. It is important to note that new media differs the mass media, and rather than 
focus on the type of social capital it may help foster in certain communities. This 
changes the understanding of a generalised social capital as being formed in 
“bottom up” manner to one more relational to “linking” social capital specifically. A 
more critical consideration of platforms such as Twitter would engage with it in terms 
of the vertical power relationships that are evident on the microblogging site and the 
way in which they influence emerging networks. This is consistent with the work of 
self-styled cyber-realist Evgeny Morozov, one of many researchers to argue that the 
focus should be on how online networks interact with pre-existing power structures 
rather than the potential of new media to revolutionise both political and non-political 
group behaviour.46  
Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that individuals are influenced by 
the behaviour of people they do not know directly. 47  There are two possible 
implications for the present study that emerge from this ‘contagion’ effect. First, 
“virtual proximity” may strengthen the ingroup identities of those who participate in 
parades and protests in Northern Ireland. This has been referred to as 
“cyberbalkanisation,” where online groups consist mainly of like-minded individuals 
and interactions with members of outgroups are often fractious.48 However, Gauntlett 
argues that while this may be true in certain instances, other areas of interest (such 
as hobbies and leisure pursuits) do bring together a diverse range of individuals in 
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ways that are both more convivial and inclusive.49 Second, virtual proximity may lead 
to the remediation of parades and protests, whereby people construct new meanings 
and expressions from pre-existing social interactions and relationships 50 . An 
example of this may be seen in how Facebook has effectively changed the meaning 
of the term “friends” insofar as “friendship” is now viewed as having the potential to 
exist on new media platforms and/or in reality.51 This raises the possibility of altering 
the nature of boundaries between groups of people by simultaneously de-territorising 
and re-territorising spaces.52 This study will examine such a scenario in the context 
of Northern Irish communities directly affected by parades and related protests. In 
this way, it will explore the potential use of social media to transform perceptions of 
space in divided societies. 
Conclusion 
The emergence of social media in recent years has added a new dimension to the 
networks associated with parades and protest in Northern Ireland. While there has 
been extensive research into the role of social media in protests in countries as 
diverse as Egypt and the United States in recent years, very little detailed analysis 
has emerged in relation to how these tools are being used in Northern Ireland. In 
particular, the potential use of social media by community groups to ease sectarian 
tensions during the marching season merits attention. Hence, this study will focus 
not only on how social media is being used by relevant stakeholders during parades 
and related protests, but also on its broader impact upon public perceptions of such 
issues. In this way, it will help identify examples of good practice in relation to the 
use of social media for the promotion of good relations in Northern Ireland. 
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Part 2. The Impact of Social Media on 
Parades and Protest in Northern Ireland 
 
This section of the report will identify and explore two distinct areas in relation to 
social media and parades and protests in Northern Ireland: 
 How social media sites are being used in relation to both parades and 
protests in both urban and rural contexts, both positively and negatively; and 
 Examples of how social media has been employed in work with a community 
relations focus in Northern Ireland. 
This research project sought to gauge the views and experiences of groups and 
individuals relevant to this research area. Formal focus group discussions with 
approximately forty band members from three different areas of Northern Ireland 
were conducted. These focus group discussions were based on a pre-agreed set of 
questions, to ensure focus and standardisation. Representatives from Statutory 
agencies and bodies such as: Belfast City Council; the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland; and the Parades Commission of Northern Ireland were also consulted in this 
process. This multi-levelled approach was with a view to ensuring this research 
provided a comprehensive overview of the issues at stake with regard to social 
media and parades and protests.  
Given the sensitive area of focus of this research there were many ethical issues to 
consider. Our approach was framed by two central approaches: (a) How we treat the 
people whom we conduct research; and (b) Are there activities in which we should or 
should not engage in our relations?53 With this in mind, ethics approval was sought 
from the University of Leicester, and, with the permission of the participants, the first 
author digitally recorded these discussions.54 All comments have been anonymised 
at the request of those participating in the research. 
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Positive uses of social media in relation to parades and 
protests 
 
This study set out to identify the ways in which stakeholders felt that social media 
had made it easier for them to manage the heightened sectarian tensions during the 
marching season. A number of themes emerged from the interviews: the perceived 
agency and empowerment of using these sites for collecting and sharing information; 
the opportunities for greater inter-group contact and cultural understanding; and the 
ability to counteract rumours and misinformation during controversial marches and 
protests. There was also a sense amongst the participants that social media could 
help them share positive experiences of such events, and perhaps even form new 
social networks that have the potential to transcend the long-established in-group 
identities of interface communities.  
The theme of empowerment in relation to social media was repeated throughout 
many of the interviews and focus groups. Sites such as Twitter, which were said to 
be a valuable tool for communities to share their views on parades and protests. The 
nature of these networks also meant that these views are extending beyond 
individuals’ immediate social and political circles. One P/U/L community worker from 
north Belfast stated: 
It has been a tool to reach people that previously you wouldn’t have been able 
to have a conversation with, and personally to expose individuals to my own 
views, particularly around parades and protests. I think Twitter has become 
really like a lightning rod for peoples’ views and opinions 
This is an important point, as it reveals that social media is being used as a means 
for individuals to articulate views, but also that it is facilitating individuals and groups 
in engaging with others with different opinions and views on parades and protests. 
The community worker(s) felt that social media is empowering and encouraging 
individuals to communicate their views online, and is providing “safe spaces” for 
those who may not feel sufficiently empowered to engage in discussions with 
individuals and groups from “other” communities, while simultaneously encouraging 
contact with individuals and groups of alternate views. Similarly, a band member felt 
that sites such as Twitter provided a space to articulate views in a more 
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instantaneous manner, and providing an opportunity to what they described as a 
“vent”.  There is a view that this sense of social media as in effect facilitating indirect 
expression. While this may be viewed in positive terms such as reducing the 
possibility of violent confrontation between communities, it may lead to a sense of 
false security amongst the online community. In practice, this has led to extreme 
views being articulated, which have legal implications and have consequences 
offline.  
Underlying much of the discussions with community workers on the space social 
media provides individuals and groups with, the opportunities to articulate viewpoints 
which may be aligned with particular perspectives on either parades and/or protests 
was raised. One community worker encompassed this in the following terms:  
There are so many unheard or hidden voices in communities. The community 
[P/U/L] I reside in feel voiceless. Social media has provided them with a political 
alternative. 
This “political alternative” refers to social media as a tool to express the views of 
individuals and communities where it is felt that there is a lack of political 
representation in terms of articulating particular experiences and viewpoints. This 
evidences social media as a tool of agency, which is born out of a need to express 
particular perspectives in a way that is deemed to accurately reflect the perspectives 
of particular individuals and communities. Some of the interviewees perceived that 
social media reduced the distance between communities and civic leaders, such as 
their elected representatives. For example, one focus group participant from a rural 
based loyalist band used social media to express their criticism of the anti-internment 
parade held by republicans in Belfast city centre in August 2014: 
I got involved with the debates and protests about the internment parade online… 
I contacted the politicians, because you need to hold them to account and social 
media is a good way to do this.  
This sense of “holding politicians to account” was shared by other members of the 
group and in other interviews. The public nature of social media means that 
politicians are perceived to be more accessible and as such those engaging in 
protests, or indeed counter protests, view social media as an essential component in 
ensuring their viewpoints are being heard. This speaks to a wider sense of political 
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alienation that was raised by two of the bands engaging in this research, as well as a 
number of the community workers. Particular reference was made to loyalist 
communities, with interviewees and focus group participants articulating the view 
that they feel there an issue of a lack political representation for this community. 
Social media was therefore a means by which to address how many in the 
community felt “voiceless” by providing a mechanism by which to contact those 
directly in the political realm.  
The issue of representation, and how social media may be harnessed to express the 
views of individuals and groups, was one that was raised repeatedly in interviews 
and focus groups. The majority of focus groups and bands engaging with this 
research believed that the media vilified the protesters who were behind the 
Twaddell “peace camp”’: 
There’s two sides, on one you have the media. The media are always going to 
portray the protest like that at Twaddell as just trouble. But then you have social 
media, where you’ve people who were there and saw things that were happening 
to people that were simply using their right to protest, and they were then able to 
put that out over social media, through videos. It got the message out there that it 
isn’t all bad.  
Social media appeared to be empowering these participants to challenge what they 
perceived as the negative and inaccurate portrayals of protests, such as the one at 
Twaddell. Similarly, there was a sense that the media focus was disproportionality 
focusing on contentious parades at the expense of those protests rather than those 
that routinely take place without issue:  
The amount of parades and protests that have happened with no issues and 
there’s no focus or discussions about it in the media or on social media. 
Hence it was no surprise that the majority of both community workers and band 
members felt that social media was an invaluable tool in their efforts to ensure more 
accurate portrayals of parades and protests in the mainstream media.   
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How social media is being used by bands and the Loyal Orders 
 
There was a perception among some participants that social media was more a focal 
point for bands rather that the Loyal Orders, given that they viewed bands as 
predominantly being composed of younger members: 
I think bands are a younger generation so that’s why you see them on social 
media 
While this is a valid point in relation to the scale of use of social media by particular 
groups, it is nevertheless important to also consider how the Loyal Orders use social 
media in relation to parades and protests. One member of both a rural loyalist band 
and Orange Lodge: 
I think social media can be used as a positive, especially for the Orange Order. 
For a lot of years the Orange Order was seen to be doing everything behind 
closed doors, now they have a platform on social media they can use to show 
what their culture is... It [social media] promotes understanding. The Orange 
[Order] is learning [from their experience online], we are learning that we need to 
put our message across to everyone 
This use of social media as a tool for education was just one of the innovative ways it 
was being used by particular groups. Social media is providing an opportunity to 
increase the transparency of the viewpoints of groups such as the Loyal Orders and 
as such is being employed as part of a wider approach to reduce misconceptions 
about them their practices. This is also recognised in relation to the specific protests 
at Twaddell, in that social media was viewed as a key component in the 
dissemination of a specific message underlying the protests, and ultimately the 
reduction of violence: 
Twaddell turned out to be positive this year on social media, because there is an 
element of control that is being brought out on social media. The message of 
“we’re standing together” has moved online, as the general consensus and 
message from the Orange Order is “no trouble” and this was proven this summer. 
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Contrary to perceptions of social media as a sphere of contestation, social media 
was discussed in relation to the development and fostering of mutual understanding. 
Social media is already providing some opportunities to reduce misconceptions 
about particular groups, protest issues, and cultural practices. There is potential to 
harness social media in a deliberate manner to educate, inform and develop 
engagement between groups is evident and illustrates the opportunity afforded by 
social media in relation to work aimed at building relationships.  
Conclusion 
 
The interviewees perceived that that there were many positive ways that social 
media could be used relation to parades and protests. These included: issues of 
agency and empowerment; inter-cultural understanding; countering misinformation 
and inaccurate media portrayals of issues such as the Twaddell peace camp.  
sharing positive experiences of parades, and providing educational resources to 
those who had little knowledge about the Loyal Orders. Interviewees felt that social 
media empowered individuals and groups to not only articulate their views, but also 
to. In some instances this afforded an opportunity to move beyond dominant 
narratives and reveal the complexity of issues in a bid to increase mutual 
understanding. In a sense, social media increased the transparency of particular 
groups’ and individuals’ views. However, research participants were keen to 
emphasise that despite these positives aspects of social media, it could also easily 
be used as a tool to damage relationships between, and perceptions of, 
communities.  
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Negative uses of social media in relation to parades and 
protests 
 
Social media was also identified as being used in a negative way in relation to 
parades and protests.  Participants outlined several negative aspects of social media 
including: the instantaneous nature of reactions it facilitates; its use to spread false 
information and rumours; how it appeared to reinforce the sectarian views of some 
users; the role it played in distorting the narratives of the protesters; and how it has 
generated fear in certain areas.  
The immediacy of social media was identified as a key negative feature of 
interactions in relation to both parades and protest. Many of the interviewees felt that 
the immediacy of social media prompted knee-jerk reactions amongst members of 
the public in response to specific issues: 
It [social media] doesn’t call for thoughtful, considered responses. Social media 
almost calls for people to knee jerk in their reactions…Whilst it allows you to 
engage and expand the coverage of your message, the downside to it is it 
becomes emotionally driven. 
These immediate reactions were not considered conducive to constructive 
engagement with issues that polarised opinion, such as contentious parades or 
protests. Although the majority of participants agreed that “thinking before you tweet” 
was good practice in theory, the reality is that many felt an emotional investment in 
the parades and protests, regardless of their position, and as such this becomes 
harder to apply in reality. Despite the homophily of online groups, social media 
remains essentially individualistic in the context of both parades and protests, in the 
sense that the reactions to specific events and issues are ultimately the responsibility 
of individuals. These individual reactions nevertheless may have ramifications at the 
group level. One community worker stated: 
I think for me personally I am very conscious of the opinions and views that I 
espouse [online] and how that can have a knock on effect on the ground. Also, 
how that can impact other peoples’ views and how they think. I try to be 
measured but that doesn’t always work, as we are emotional animals, so you do 
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you get times where you put things out where you may have no if the clock was 
turned back. 
The point here is that social media ultimately provides individuals with a platform to 
air their views in a manner which reflects the emotion of a given situation and as 
such it is almost impossible to negate the negative impact of more polemic views 
once they are in the public domain. This evidences the need for greater awareness 
of the potential of social media to inform views and the nature of relations far beyond 
the level of the individual. It also reveals the potential of the immediate nature of 
social media to present a distorted or reactionary version of events and issues and 
as such inform wider views of parades and protests. 
 
This relationship between the immediacy of social media and parades and protests 
evoked discussions on issues relating to false information being disseminated over 
social media. False information and rumours were not only said to be shaping the 
nature of parades and protests, but such incidents were said to be undermining 
efforts to build mutual understanding and reciprocity between communities. This 
sentiment was expressed by one PUL community worker: 
Social media has become a real driver [for inter-communal tension]. It has 
become a very negative dynamic, because there was a lot of false information 
and misinformation and it was fuelling peoples’ fears. It was becoming a driver 
for problems on the streets [during protests]. I saw it in particular in north Belfast, 
when people were tweeting out things they had heard second and third hand.   .  
 
A recurring theme in the interviews with those engaging in community work was that 
such false or misleading information increased sectarian tensions in relation to 
parades and protests. For example, one community worker suggested that the scale 
of anti-social behaviour reported on social media sites was often exaggerated:  
If something happens all of a sudden it’s on Facebook…You might find if there’s 
ten lads throwing stones [at a protest], and on Facebook and Twitter they’ve 
turned it into a full scale riot. 
Another interviewee discussed the misinformation on social media in relation to the 
specific protests at Twaddell, as heightening tensions. They characterised this as a 
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form of online “Chinese whispers,” with rumours, many of which were generated 
intentionally, and were often embellished as they were shared from user to user on 
sites such as Facebook and Twitter. Such ‘whispers’ not only had a negative impact 
upon how members of the public perceived protests, such as Twaddell, but also had 
the potential to incite violence and/or tensions near the interface areas of North 
Belfast.. 
 
A number of participants identified an expectation of violence that was magnified in 
relation to parades and protests as a result of the immediacy of social media.. This 
was described by a PUL community worker from east Belfast in terms of voyeurism: 
On the likes of Twitter and Facebook people are almost voyeuristic around 
violence and tension around parades. 
 
This relates to the impact of social media on the nature of parades and protests, and 
evokes a sense of “virtual distance” rather than of the “virtual proximity” discussed 
previously. In being removed from events on social networks, the reality of tensions 
and potential violence are being minimised and those discussing these issues and 
events online have the potential to de-humanise them. This approach may be a 
factor in the sectarianism many research participants perceive to be abundant on 
social networks in relation to parades and protests. One participant (involved with 
both a community group in north Belfast and a loyalist band) viewed it as follows: 
Generally speaking, social media has reinforced a lot of sectarianism. It’s 
opened up a new front or battleground for those who want to keep battling and 
are influenced by sectarian attitudes or tendencies. 
 
This effective new online sectarian “battle ground” is perhaps one of the most 
negative experiences of research participants in relation to discussions about 
parades and protests online. Many of the participants acknowledged that the 
anonymity afforded by social media encouraged some users to express sectarian 
views online. A minority of interviewees viewed this as indicative of the current 
political impasse that had left contentious issues such as parading unresolved.  
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The participants also confirmed that social media was being used to distribute 
material that heightened sectarian tensions and incited violence. This was 
referenced in relation to both parades and protests:  
I remember watching the speeches at protests and they were whipping people 
up and it was re-tweeted. 
While prominent supporters of the Twaddell protests were keen to re-affirm their 
continuing belief in the underlying values of their protest, they also felt that the 
number of times these videos of speeches were shared was “in a sense an 
endorsement”. The reality is that despite disparate views of protest and parade 
supporters in relation to particular statements, social media is facilitating the 
appearance of protest supporters as a monolith. As such, it does not facilitate 
understanding of the complex and diverse factors leading individuals and groups to 
support, or indeed challenge, the basis for particular protests or parades.  
The lack of a nuanced understanding of the values of these groups and individuals in 
relation to protests and parades being expressed on social media is also perceived 
as having a profound impact on the perception of specific groups and organisations. 
One research participant spoke of the stereotypes of loyalism that circulated online: 
The Loyal Orders have been caricatured [online]…Social media has upped 
the ante in the sense of the labels that are placed on bands and lodges.  
This “caricaturing” of some of the groups engaging in parading and protests, means 
that groups are effectively having to challenge representations of themselves both on 
and offline and this is having an impact on ensuring the message underlying 
particular protests is being kept clear in terms of the original intentions, i.e. to ensure 
that the original parade route is reinstated. Social media provides a challenge for 
groups and movements in ensuring that their original message and/or aim is the 
focus of the narrative surrounding protests rather than other issues which emerge 
online.   
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Conclusion 
 
The overarching theme of the negative experiences of social media in relation to 
parades and protests was the manner in which social media is further facilitating the 
essentialisation of both perceptions and representations of communal identity. This 
coupled with the immediacy of social networks may have served to magnify inter-
communal tensions and conflict. The evocative nature of parades and protests 
means that social media provides a platform for groups and individuals to articulate 
polemic views in an unprecedentedly accessible manner. There was an awareness 
on the part of those engaging in parades and protests of a need to ensure that social 
media is not a solely negative phenomenon. However, the perceived enormity of the 
task of ensuring social media does not continue to simply be another sphere of 
contestation for communities was an underlying theme in the interviews. These 
concerns are warranted when we consider that social media is also no longer a 
peripheral tool of communication for communities, conversely in some cases it is the 
only contact between communities55.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
55 O. Young…..  
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Social media and community relations work in Northern 
Ireland 
 
This research has documented the positives and negatives of social media being 
experienced by those engaging in or being effected by parades and protests, but it is 
also important to gauge how social media is impacting upon the work of groups and 
agencies seeking to build relationships during and in the wake of such events. The 
manner in which groups and agencies are utilising social media is also important, in 
that it illustrates how social media is being employed on a multi-levelled basis in 
relation to work that is informing the nature of community relations. 
This research found that many groups and agencies are strategically utilising social 
media in a manner which ensures that they are not viewed as actively participating in 
the debate on parades and/or protests, but rather that they are acting as a 
mechanism through which groups and individuals could communicate their views on 
particular issues to the political realm. One agency representative articulated this in 
the following way: 
We receive what [community] groups want to communicate and put it out. We 
also want to act as a conduit between community groups and government. Social 
media is one way of getting these messages out to government and civic leaders. 
This illustrates the increasing centrality of social media as “linking” grassroots action  
the political sphere. This becomes magnified in relation to parades and protests 
when social media is being employed as a means to espouse or reject the principles 
underlying such activities. The immediacy, discussed previously, was described in 
empowering terms: 
There’s an immediacy about it which is important… There is something very 
important about communicating this way. 
Research participants also communicated a sense of the need for grassroots based 
groups and agencies to utilise social media as a means of ensuring that they are 
accessible in terms of communications as it is “keeping the lines of communication 
open” 
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However, this apparent need for transparency online was balanced against the 
awareness of the challenges of occupying an effective “space between” grassroots 
based groups and the political sphere, and the need to ensure that they do not 
further complicate issues. A Belfast City Council representative encompassed this in 
the following terms: 
The Council steers away from putting anything out that is any way contentious. 
The variation in use also extended to interactions in which groups and agencies 
seeking to act as a “conduit” during parades and protests are described in 
challenging terms by one public sector agency representative: 
I think social media is increasingly impacting parades and protests… I think you 
see frankly a lot of nonsense, abuse, criticism, false information and sometimes 
deliberate, which can have a negative impact. It’s used as a lobbying/advocacy 
tool by others.  
Despite these challenges, which were similar to those experienced by the community 
workers who participated in the study, research participants from public sector 
agencies were keen to emphasise the ways in which social media enabled them to 
engage across sectors and engage with groups and individuals who may have been 
deemed “hard to reach” in terms of work aimed at building better relations between 
communities in Northern Ireland. 
A recurring theme was the issue of resourcing online platforms, with organisations 
viewing it as necessary to have bespoke social media strategy, but also a dedicated 
staff to implement it. Any strategy was described as being mainly orientated around 
information supplied by grassroots groups and individuals. In practice this meant that 
where agencies engaged with social media, it was at best tentative and driven in the 
main by a need to present a certain positive image of organisations 
We agreed to use the Council page and feed any good news stories through 
them 
However, an interesting point was made by a statutory agency representative that 
such groups are seeking to ensure their message is being communicated on social 
networks: 
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It influences us, in that the partnerships are telling us they want to communicate 
by social media and get their messages out there, but we’ve been sort of held 
back a bit, but we’re being advised to work within the Council remit [in terms of 
social media] and this creates tension as the Partnership are saying “well, we’re a 
legal entity in our own right”. 
 
Other representatives of statutory agencies were keen to emphasise how little they 
engaged with social media in their work. Indeed, for some organisations, it was an 
essential aspect of their work that they distanced themselves from the online 
debates relating to parades and protests. Social media was considered to be 
unsuitable for work which was deemed to be “too sensitive” such as mediations and 
official processes informing the status of particular parades. It was also suggested 
that while social media provides an opportunity to gain an insight into public opinion 
on particular parades and protests, they needed to be cautious when responding to 
such issues online. Social media was not viewed as providing “definitive” evidence of 
views on parades and protests, or more general issues relating to community 
relations.  
 
Another representative of another statutory agency conceded that social media was 
not necessarily wholly representative of wider feelings on parades and protests. 
However, this representative felt that this was could be rectified by ensuring that 
individuals and groups are held responsible for the views they express online, much 
as they would in person: 
 
As we get used to social media, we will learn how to use it better, and that 
includes framing how we use in a legal sense, as well as a personal sense. 
There may be things done to ensure that people are held accountable for.  
This illustrates one of the key challenges for statutory or intermediary bodies, namely 
the need to use social media responsibly in order to avoid potential pitfalls, such as 
the misinterpretation of their online content or any issue which may adversely impact 
their ability to work with all communities in Northern Ireland. 
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Conclusion 
 
This research engaged with groups and organisations directly engaged in work with 
communities impacted by parades and protests. It found that there is no standard 
approach to the use of social media in work aimed at building relationships between 
communities. In a positive sense, some representatives viewed social media as 
another channel that enabled them to reach out to local communities. However, 
many agencies appeared reluctant to fully engage on social media due to a 
perception that interactions on these sites were “unmanageable”. The lack of 
consistency in the social media strategies of these agencies suggests that there may 
be a need for a more joined up approach towards managing the impact of social 
media upon parades, related protests, and, more broadly, community relations. The 
fact remains, as articulated by those engaged in parades and protests in this 
research, that social media is now one of primary mechanisms by which individuals 
and groups are communicating, and as such it cannot continue to have a peripheral 
role in how statutory agencies and organisations are communicating with those their 
decisions and activities impact.    
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Policing, social media and parades and protests 
 
Parading and protests bring into focus the nature of policing and how this manifests 
itself during these periods. As discussed above, key stakeholders view social media 
sites as vital communication tools during public demonstrations. The issue of how it 
is impacting policing during these periods is also of paramount importance. This 
study found the following areas as relating to social media and policing during 
periods of parades and protests: the nature of relationships between the police and 
communities; the representation of the PSNI and policing; and information on social 
networks.  
 
The PSNI representatives were keen to emphasise the unprecedented opportunities 
offered by social media in terms of building relationships between the PSNI and local 
communities:  
 
Up to a year ago social media was done by people who liked social media, 
now it is much more people are starting to get into it as we see there’s a real 
benefit to it. (PSNI spokesperson 1)  
This “benefit” was described in terms of increased transparency, while affording an 
opportunity to foster relationships through increased communication with individuals 
and communities, while increasing the accessibility of the organisation: 
 
At the heart of it is a sense that genuinely people who use it in our 
organisation feel it is a very effective tool to engage with the community and 
our wider community engagement strategy (PSNI spokesperson 2)) 
Social media was characterised as an essential component in the current approach 
to engagement with communities throughout Northern Ireland. This was viewed as 
having a positive impact on the nature of interactions between the organisation and 
communities, and, as a result, relationships. However, the PSNI representatives 
were keen to emphasise that social media alone could not bring about these 
changes, but rather it had to be part of a wider policing approach to fostering 
relationships between the PSNI and local communities. They described how social 
media was facilitating the development of more positive interactions with 
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communities in areas in which the PSNI had not previously experienced community 
support: 
You can notice a slight change in the tone, like Newry and Mourne, west and 
north Belfast, you would have had negativity every day, but there is a degree 
of positivity creeping in [online]. A lot of that is built on relationships on the 
ground.56 
A key issue here is perception, and the impact of perception on the nature of 
relationships, in this case the relationships between the PSNI and local communities. 
Social media is may be viewed as challenging negative perceptions of the PSNI by 
providing representations of the service which counter negative narratives In periods 
of parades and protests the issues of perception and therefore, representation, are 
key in how relationships are maintained. Indeed, this aspect of social media in 
relation to policing and parades and protests was identified by PSNI representatives 
in almost wholly positive terms: 
It’s been a positive tool….It affords us a brilliant platform for engagement. 
 
This relates to the accessibility afforded by social media for the community to the 
PSNI, while simultaneously enabling the PSNI to ensure increased control over their 
own narrative. However, it is important to note that while social media affords the 
PSNI an opportunity to inform perception of the organisation, it also provides a 
challenge in they are represented during periods of parades and protests.  
 
Like those engaging in parades and protests, the PSNI described a situation 
whereby social media has provided both challenges and opportunities in terms of 
their representation in relation to policing during parades and protests. This is 
orientated around the positive and negative narratives of policing that have emerged 
on social media, and as such this has meant that the organisation has had to ensure 
that these narratives reflect accurately the nature of policing on the ground. One 
PSNI representative explained it in the following terms:  
                                                            
56 The PSNI representative gave the example of the Newry/Mourne Facebook page and a status which sought to 
dissuade young people from attending a rave in a disused quarry in the area. See: PSNI hit back over halted 
quarry 'rave'. Accessed http://www.u.tv/News/PSNI-hit-back-over-halted-quarry-rave/2fa0a47f-87e1-44b2-
a704-9e904370de1c 
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We’re almost fighting for the narrative to pull this back to what really matters.  
By “what really matters” the PSNI representative is referring to traditional policing, 
and not public order situations. This is an effective recognition of the centrality of 
social media in the public discourse of policing, and how during periods of parades 
and protests that social media is essential in the nature of communication. The 
nature of policing during parades and protests provides representations of a public 
order policing, which the police are now using social media to challenge: 
At the height of the tensions in Twaddell, the local area sergeant posted a 
picture of normal officers on the beat, very mundane and away from all the 
other images of the area at that point. It got a thousand views and it was put 
to me that there was no other mechanism in which we would reach that many 
people with an image like that. 
This illustrates the potential use of social media to counter narratives which may 
unnecessarily harm relationships. The potential for these narratives of policing during 
parades and protests to negatively impact the nature of relationships, was also 
related to wider public order, in that these narratives could contribute to problematic 
public order situations: 
A lot of what north Belfast were putting out was not about public order it was 
about normal policing. When you can fill a public space with images that show 
policing about being near to the community as opposed to other images that 
create fear and suspicion, that’s a very powerful thing. It’s essential to the 
maintenance of order. 
However, it is important to emphasise the awareness on the part of the PNSI that 
social media is also part of the wider issue of their accountability, in terms of how the 
public is utilising social media to share events: 
One of the big challenges in north Belfast during the flags dispute was how 
we would respond to everything being videoed. I was filmed being questioned 
and it gave people a platform and gave us a platform to respond.  
In further discussing this with the PSNI officers, they evoked a sense that the 
medium of video was powerful and had up until then been avoided due to safety 
fears of specific officers. These representatives explained that the fact that many 
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members of the public now have access to mobile recording devices which are 
simultaneously connected to the internet (such as smart phones) means that there is 
in a sense a requirement to be more open to being filmed. Rather than using social 
media to solely “push” a certain representation of policing in these videos, the PSNI 
appear to have chosen to engage with issues raised by members of the pubic via 
these sites. A PSNI representative stated: 
We had to either choose to engage with it or ignore it, and we chose to 
engage with it. (PSNI spokesperson 2) 
This evidences the increasing centrality of social media to the nature how the PSNI 
are engaging with those participating in parades and protests, during and in the 
wake of these events.  
 
While this research found that the PSNI found that not only was social media 
facilitating the portrayal of “traditional” policing (i.e. not public order situations), it also 
found the issue of rumours and/or misinformation a key feature of their experience of 
it in relation to parades and protests. PSNI representatives described it in terms that 
meant that social media is in fact empowering them to counter such misinformation:  
For us, it [social media] is more about knocking rumours on the head, or 
clarifying information.  
In tandem with this, social media is also facilitating the distribution of accurate 
information on an unprecedented scale. Indeed, this was described as not being a 
simple matter of police resourcing but the knock on effect of the “sharing” by 
individuals and groups online. This was particularly pertinent to public order 
situations where the mainstream media were viewed as accessing information on the 
nature of parades and /or protests disseminated by the PSNI on social media: 
Any benefit we’re getting from social media in public order situations is almost 
by proxy. Journalists are picking up our stuff and tweeting it. Our message 
gets out. 
There is a sense that the PSNI are mindful of harnessing the “viral” aspect of social 
media. This was viewed as being particularly effective in ensuring that correct 
information was provided and disseminated in relation to what constitutes both a 
peaceful and lawful protest: 
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There was some stuff we put out about how people could have a peaceful 
protest… We wanted to re-communicate how people could keep protests 
peaceful and lawful. 
This was described as a “key” message in relation to the PSNI’s engagement with 
protests concerning Belfast City Council’s decision to alter the number of days the 
Union Flag flies at Belfast City Hall. However, it is important to note that the PSNI 
recognised how the physical form of protests are informing their responses, and as 
such there is a tailored approach in terms of how they choose to communicate via 
social media with protesters and provide information on a given protest. This is 
exemplified in the differentiation between different protests in Northern Ireland:  
Our experience of the G8 protest57, was that people gather under a banner 
but that they are disparate groups, as they don’t have any structure for 
negotiation.  It’s different to the profile in Northern Ireland where there is a 
defined leadership and narrative and stand in between those cohesive 
groups. 
Therefore, the defined groups in protests such as the flag related protests, or those 
continuing at Twaddell are more conducive to engagement via social media given 
that the PSNI has more experience of working with the groups and communities 
involved, as well as a better understanding of the issues at stake. The PSNI also 
conceded that social media is at times providing them with information on events as 
they relate to parades and protests: 
From the intelligence view, our first in [-sight to potential protests/public order 
situations] is sometimes social media 
There was a sense from these comments that the PSNI are practically engaging with 
parades and protests, and other public order situations in their initial stages via 
social media. However, given the earlier discussion on misinformation, this was also 
recognised as requiring confirmation in relation to the extent which reports on social 
media can be employed as the basis for a particular course of action for the PSNI: 
                                                            
57 See:  “Marchers  protest  in  Belfast  against  G8  policies”.  Accessed  at:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‐
northern‐ireland‐22909025 
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Part of the challenge is holding your nerve… There’s so much stuff on social 
media… One maverick individual can make a statement about a protest and if 
you take that as gospel you could have difficulty in terms of knee jerking in 
your reaction. That’s were traditional policing comes in and things need to be 
corroborated. 
Therefore, while social media is a key factor in how parades and protests are being 
policed, it is not the sole basis for how the PSNI are reacting to situations, but rather 
a component of a wider strategy in relation to how the police are engaging in these 
events. 
Conclusion  
The PSNI demonstrated a significant awareness of the centrality of social media to 
the nature of parades and protests in Northern Ireland. This included the impact of 
social media on the nature of relationships between the police and communities; the 
representation of the PSNI and policing; and information about parades and protests 
on social networks. The Service has sought to embrace social media as a 
mechanism to increase transparency in relation to the policing of both parades and 
protests, as well as increasing their accountability. While this has may be viewed as 
a positive development, this research also indicated the significant resources 
required to develop this approach. However, the capacity for the Service to ensure 
that police work is a sense de-mystified, means that social media is being harnessed 
as a powerful tool in relation to how the PSNI is building relationships with 
communities. This approach is also underpinned by an awareness of the centrality of 
social media in how parades and protests are concluded on the ground. The PSNI 
representatives articulated a need to ensure that accurate information regarding 
parades and protests is being communicated on social media platforms, revealing 
social media to have an increasingly central role in the nature of the policing of both 
parades and protests.  
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Part 3. Tweeting the Twelfth:  How citizens used Twitter 
during the Orange Order parades in July 2014.  
 
In July 2014, Northern Ireland Secretary of State Teresa Villiers praised the Orange 
Order, as well as nationalist and unionist political representatives, for helping deliver 
the most peaceful Twelfth in recent years.58  Fears of a repeat of the sectarian 
clashes previously seen in North Belfast, in relation to the Parade Commission’s 
decision to ban the return leg of the Ligoniel Orange lodges from passing by the 
Ardoyne shops, were not realised, with parades across Northern Ireland passing off 
without incident. While it is beyond the scope of this study to fully explain these 
events, the ways in which critics and supporters of the Orange Order used social 
media to express their views about the contentious parade merit analysis. Previous 
research has suggested that sites such as Facebook and Twitter have played an 
increasingly important role in the orchestration of anti-social behaviour in interface 
areas, alongside other modes of communication such as the SMS text messaging 
services available on mobile phones. 59  Therefore, this study was designed to 
empirically investigate the ways in which the peaceful protests of loyalists and 
nationalist residents in July 2014 were digitally mediated. The second author 
collected the dataset and explored the themes that emerged from the comments 
posted on Twitter, in relation to the Parade Commission’s decision to reroute the 
parade, the ‘graduated response’ of unionists and loyalists and events as they 
unfolded on the 12th July 60 . The study also explored how users responded to 
rumours and misinformation spread on the micro-blogging site. Such information has 
been identified as having a negative impact upon cross-community relations in areas 
such as North Belfast, particularly amongst young people in interface areas.61 The 
nature of the debate amongst those ‘tweeters’ who commented on the contentious 
                                                            
58 The full text of the Secretary of State’s comments can be found here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/villiers-commends-intensive-work-to-bring-about-peaceful-12th-july 
[accessed 10 October 2014] 
59 P, Reilly “’Anti-Social’ Networking in Northern Ireland: Policy Responses to Young people’s Use of Social 
Media for Organising Anti-Social Behaviour”, Policy & Internet: (2011) Vol. 3: Iss.1, Article 7, 5. 
60 Further details on the ‘graduated response’ were released by unionist and loyalist spokespersons on the eve of 
the controversial march, which included plans for a six-minute pause at all Orange marches on the Twelfth to 
represent the time it would take for the North Belfast march to return home via its traditional route and a series of 
peaceful protest parades later that evening. 
61 O. Young, “New Media and Young People in Interface Areas of Belfast”, Shared Space, 14 (Belfast:NICRC, 
2014), 
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Ardoyne parade was also investigated, with a focus on whether they used 
inflammatory, sectarian language in response to the events as they unfolded.      
Specifically, there were three research questions that emerged from the preceding 
literature review: 
 
1) How did supporters and opponents of the Orange Order use Twitter to 
respond to the rerouting of the contentious Orange Order parade in North 
Belfast? 
2) Was there much evidence of rational debate amongst these users in relation 
to the parade dispute? 
3) How did these users respond to the rumours and misinformation that 
surrounded the parade? 
 
Sample 
 
These questions were explored through a critical thematic analysis of content posted 
and circulated on Twitter between 11th and 14th July 2014. This period included a 
number of key events in the 2014 marching season, including the annual ‘Eleventh 
night’ bonfires, the outward and return journeys of the annual Twelfth parades across 
Northern Ireland, and the planned protests by loyalists and nationalist residents in 
relation to the rerouted parade in Ardoyne. It was anticipated that most eyewitnesses 
who wished to share their perspectives on these events would have done so within 
this period. Furthermore, rumours and misinformation about these events were most 
likely to be circulated online within this 72-hour period.  
The second author used the text-mining software tool Discovertext 
(www.discovertext.com) to collect and archive the tweets that contained a number of 
relevant keywords. 
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Twelfth hashtags 
 
Three hashtags, ‘#12th,’ ‘#Twelfth’ and ‘#TheTwelfth2014,’ were identified and used 
to capture the Twitter activity surrounding the demonstrations on the Twelfth. Both 
opponents and supporters of the Loyal Orders were expected to tweet about their 
experiences using one of these hashtags. A total of 2,233 tweets posted under these 
hashtags were analysed as part of the study. The one most frequently used in this 
sample was the #12th, which was referred to in 1,136 tweets collected during this 
period (see Table 1). It should be noted that most users contributed only once to 
each hashtag. For example, #TheTwelfth2014 had the fewest number of tweets 
(258) and tweeters (210), with only 23 users tweeting or retweeting content more 
than once during this period. A similar trend emerged from analysis of #TheTwelfth 
and #12th, with the former having 92 users who tweeted at least twice and the latter 
just 89.  
 
Table 1: Tweets collected under Twelfth hashtags 
 
Hashtag Number of tweets Number of unique 
tweeters 
#12th 1,136 771 
#TheTwelfth2014 258 210 
#TheTwelfth 839 441 
 
 
As anticipated, most tweets were posted under each hashtag on the 12th July 2014 
(see Figure 1). A closer inspection of the data revealed that Twitter activity peaked 
on these hashtags at significant milestones during the Twelfth. The peak of #12th 
coincided with the morning march (10am), whereas most tweets were posted under 
#TheTwelfth shortly after their return leg at 7pm. This preliminary review of the 
tweets collected under each hashtag also revealed that a small number of tweets 
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made no reference to the Twelfth parades. For example, a spam message written in 
Mandarin referring to ‘Future Diary’ was retweeted multiple times under #12th. The 
same hashtag, which had the highest proportion of non-relevant tweets of those 
analysed, also featured an advertisement for an event that was due to take place in 
a nightclub in Oakland, California. However, the vast majority of these tweets were 
deemed to be relevant to the study. 
Figure 1: Twelfth hashtag trends, 12 July 2014. 
 
 
 
Ardoyne 
 
An additional keyword search, ‘Ardoyne’ was used to identify tweets that referred 
specifically to the decision to reroute the parade by the Ligoniel Orange lodges, and 
related flute bands such as the Pride of Ardoyne (POA), in North Belfast. A total of 
1,842 tweets were identified that mentioned the name of the North Belfast district. 
Like the Twelfth hashtags, most tweeters (717 out of 1,025 unique users) only 
posted one tweet mentioning this word during this period of data collection. The 
‘Ardoyne’ tweets also peaked at the same time (7pm) as those posted under 
#TheTwelfth (see Figure 2). One interpretation of this finding might be that that 
viewers of ‘flagship’ teatime news programmes such as BBC Newsline and UTV 
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Live, which had provided coverage of the day’s events, had turned to social media to 
seek out information about the ‘homeward’ leg of the parade.  
Figure 2: Tweets mentioning Ardoyne, 12th July 2014 
 
 
The preliminary review of the data revealed that a small minority of the tweets were 
non-relevant to the study. Most notably, a picture posted by BBC Northern Ireland 
(BBC NI) television reporter Mark Simpson on 27th June 2014, showing a cross-
community ‘sleep-out’ in Ardoyne, was retweeted 53 times (and ‘favorited’ 55 times) 
during the period of data collection. There were also a few tweets circulating during 
this period that promoted community events, such as a family fun day due to be held 
by the Ardoyne GAA club in July.  
 
There were two limitations that should be acknowledged. First, despite Discovertext 
allowing researchers access to the complete public data stream of Twitter (also 
known as the ‘firehose’), it is difficult to verify the representativeness of these tweets. 
[It is also possible that some tweeters may have been talking about the contentious 
Ardoyne parade without using some of these keywords. Second, these tweets might 
be better characterised as the “traces of behaviour” of a small but vocal minority that 
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nevertheless lack the robustness of traditional opinion polls.62 Although guidelines 
provided to journalists by organisations such as National Public Radio (NPR) 
indicate that retweets are de facto endorsements of the original message,63 many 
tweeters still provide disclaimers on their accounts stating that no such judgement 
should be made in relation to their retweets. Therefore, in the absence of 
corroborative evidence, it would be misleading to make too many inferences about 
the attitudes of those responsible for these posts. The same might be said for those 
who did not express their opinion on the content of such tweets in online spaces. 
Previous research has indicated that the majority of individuals who access online 
spaces are unlikely to make public contributions, such as comments on social media 
sites.64 The views of these ‘watchers’ (often described as ‘lurkers’) on contentious 
parades in Northern Ireland are virtually impossible to detect using text-mining tools 
such as Discovertext.  
Nevertheless, the purpose of this study was to analyse how critics and supporters of 
the Orange Order used Twitter to respond to contentious issues such as the 
rerouting of the Ardoyne parade. Therefore, it was appropriate to focus on the 
themes that emerged from these tweets despite the inherent limitations, such as the 
generalisability of the results, outlined above. 
Critical Thematic Analysis 
 A critical thematic analysis of these tweets was conducted in August 2014.65 It 
focused on the words most frequently used by tweeters in their interpretation of key 
events relating to the contentious Ardoyne parade. The forcefulness of these tweets, 
as well as the use of derogatory and sectarian language, was noted in order to 
                                                            
62 M. Mahrt, M., & M. Scharkow (2013). The value of big data in digital media research. Journal of Broadcasting & 
Electronic Media, 57(1): 24. . 
63 For more on these guidelines see this article: http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/07/at-npr-retweets-are-
endorsements-after-all/ [accessed 10 October 2014] 
64 Z. Papacharissi (2010) A Networked Self: Identity, Community and Culture on Social Network Sites. London: 
Routledge.  
 
65 V. Braun, V. and V. Clarke, (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 
3 (2). pp. 77-101. ISSN 1478-0887, Available at: http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/11735/2/thematic_analysis_revised_-
_final.pdf [accessed 10 September 2014]/ 
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assess the nature of the debate surrounding these issues, in a similar vein to 
previous work involving the study of YouTube comments.66  
Direct quotes from public figures such as bloggers, politicians and professional 
journalists were used to illustrate key themes. However, a number of measures were 
taken to protect the anonymity of those unaware participants who lacked the 
resources to control information about themselves in the public domain.67 These 
included the removal of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), such as username 
and gender, and paraphrasing their tweets in order to avoid them being located 
using a search engine. This was congruent with previous research that has 
suggested that the granularity of using verbatim quotes from participants is not 
essential in order to convey the key themes that emerge from datasets.68 Such 
themes were also illustrated through the use of word clouds that visualised the 
prominent keywords in the dataset. The content collected from Twitter in this study 
was manually entered into the open-source tool Tagul (https://tagul.com) in order to 
create the word clouds that feature below. While PII was removed in order to protect 
the anonymity of these tweeters, offensive and sectarian language was included in 
order to assess the nature of the debate surrounding these contentious issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
66 M.G.Antony and R.J. Thomas (2010) ‘This is citizen journalism at its finest’: YouTube and the public sphere in 
the Oscar Grant shooting incident. New Media & Society 12(8): 1280–1296.  
 
67 R.V. Kozinets, (2010) Netnography: Doing Ethnographic Research Online, London: SAGE. 
68P.  Reilly, (2014) The ‘Battle of Stokes Croft’ on YouTube: The development of an ethical stance for the study of 
online comments, SAGE Cases in Methodology.  
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Results 
 
Positive, family-friendly images of the Orange Order dominate the Twelfth hashtags 
Analysis of the three hashtags revealed how the Orange Order and their supporters 
were using Twitter to convey a positive, ‘family-friendly’ image of the Twelfth. This 
was illustrated by the frequent occurrence of words such as ‘celebrations’ and 
‘wonderful’ in the #Twelfth2014 corpus (see Figure 4). Many tweeters created 
‘#Twelfthieselfies’, ‘self-portrait’ pictures taken on smart phones by members of the 
Orange Order and shared on social media sites such as Twitter. Members often took 
these at the site of Eleventh night bonfires or as they made their way to morning 
parades on the 12th July. Spectators also hashtagged pictures of their relatives 
taking part in the parades across Northern Ireland, with no accompanying text that 
could be construed as an attack on either the Parades Commission, nationalist 
residents’ groups, or their political representatives. For example, there were nine 
retweets of one picture of an unidentified march that was captioned ‘looking great 
boys!’  With so few of these tweets geotagged, it was impossible to verify exactly 
where these images had been taken. Nevertheless, Belfast, Markethill, and the 
Rossnowlagh in County Donegal were amongst those locations referred to by 
tweeters responsible for this content.  
Figure 3: Most frequently occurring words in #Twelfth2014 sample (11-14 July 2014). 
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The Orange Order also used Twitter to promote positive images of the Twelfth. The 
Order’s official Twitter account (@OrangeOrder) was the most frequent contributor to 
the #TheTwelfth2014, which appeared to be their official #Twelfth hashtag. The 
Order tweeted frequently throughout this period, providing links to media coverage of 
the Twelfth and sharing numerous images of the Eleventh night firework displays 
and scenes from the 17 demonstrations that were taking place across Northern 
Ireland. A recurring theme in these tweets was the high turnout at these events. 
Although it is difficult to independently verify such claims, they described the 
numbers who participated in parades such as the one in Kilkeel as “impressive.”69 
There were also many tweets directing users towards a statement on the website of 
the Grand Orange Lodge issued on behalf of Grand Master Edward Stevenson, in 
which he referred to the “unprecedented numbers of people” who had joined in the 
celebrations of the 324th anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne.70 Stevenson also 
praised his Orange brethren for their peaceful demonstrations against the Parade 
Commission’s Ardoyne determination and contrasted this with the ‘hate crimes’ of 
republicans that had resulted in several Orange halls being vandalised during this 
period.71 These attacks were also highlighted by a small number of users who had 
tagged their tweets with #TheTwelfth.   
That is not to say that there were no tweets found in these hashtags that appeared 
critical of the Orange Order. Rather, there appeared to be a small but vocal minority 
who ‘hijacked’ these hashtags in order to highlight their opposition to what one user 
described as the ‘annual hate fest’ of the Twelfth. These tweeters went as far as to 
compare the Orange institution to the Klu Klux Klan and claimed that they were 
‘fascists’ who ‘hated everyone.’ A few contributors to the #Twelfth2014 tweeted a link 
to an article on the news media website The Journal (www.journal.ie) that focused 
on the viral image of a five-year old girl who had had the initials KAT (an abbreviated 
form of ‘Kill All Taigs’) painted on her face at a Twelfth party. 72  It would be 
reasonable to presume that the handful of users who retweeted this story were doing 
                                                            
69 Orange Order (OrangeOrder). “Impressive turnout of Orangemen last night in Kilkeel  #TheTwelfth2014.” 13 
July 2013, 9.48p.m. Tweet. 
70 The full statement can be accessed here: 
http://www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/news.aspx?id=100793#.VHyD7IvjY_u (accessed 10 October 2014) 
71 Graffiti was left on several Orange Halls in Ballycastle and Fermanagh over the 12th demonstrations: 
http://www.grandorangelodge.co.uk/news.aspx?id=100793#.VHyD7IvjY_u 
72 The story can be found here: http://www.thejournal.ie/psni-investigating-girl-with-kill-all-taigs-paint-1570811-
Jul2014/ (accessed 10 October 2014) 
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so in order to highlight the perceived sectarianism of the Orange institutions and its 
supporters. Alongside specific complaints about the disruption caused by the 
Twelfth, there were also signs that these users continued to hold zero-sum 
perceptions of politics. For example, one tweeter criticised the hypocrisy of those 
who claimed that the removal of the Union flag from Belfast City Hall was a hate 
crime while justifying the burning of the Tricolour on Eleventh night bonfires as 
‘culture.’ The same user also criticised the PSNI for being complicit in what they 
described as ‘hate crimes’ that were regularly perpetrated during these bonfires. 
Overall, there was a notable absence of sectarian language in the tweets collected 
under the three Twelfth hashtags. Nor was there any evidence of rational debate 
about contentious parades emerging between those who had created this content.  
Indeed, the most frequently retweeted content in these hashtags belonged to 
professional journalists who were reporting on the parades across Northern Ireland. 
BBC NI broadcast journalist Clodagh Rice was one of the most frequent contributors 
to #12th providing regular updates on the Orange Order parades that passed St 
Patrick’s church in Belfast, the site of minor skirmishes between nationalist 
protesters and marchers in July 2013. Rice confirmed in her tweets that the march 
had adhered to the Parade Commission’s determination that only a single drumbeat 
should be played as the parade passed the Donegall Street church.73 While noting 
that there had been some brief heated exchanges between protesters and the 
marchers, she reported that the march had passed off peacefully. Similar themes 
emerged from the Twitter streams of other professional journalists who were 
reporting on the Twelfth using these hashtags.   
Very little to report during the most peaceful Ardoyne parade for years 
The absence of violence in the contested interface area meant that there was very 
little for citizens or professional journalists to comment on during this period. This 
was perhaps best illustrated by the high number of retweets for humorous posts, 
such as those that mentioned US singer-songwriter Garth Brooks. He had been the 
subject of much media coverage north and south of the border prior to the Twelfth, 
                                                            
73 Rice, Clodagh (ClodaghLRice). “Fr Michael Sheehan watches Orange parade past St Patrick’s Church on 
Donegall St- single drum beat #12th.”12 July 2014, 10.15 a.m. Tweet.  
 
55 
 
after he had been forced to cancel several Dublin tour dates due to a licencing issue 
in Croke Park. Local comedian and actor Tim McGarry was one of several users to 
joke that the singer could “solve all of Ireland’s problems” if he agreed to play the 
Ardoyne shops. This post was amongst the most frequently retweeted in the sample, 
with 148 retweets between the 8th and 14th July. 
Nevertheless, professional journalists were still responsible for the most frequently 
retweeted content referring to the events in Ardoyne during this period. Analysis of 
their tweets indicated how little was happening at the scene of the contentious march 
throughout the Twelfth. The word ‘peaceful’ was frequently used to characterise the 
morning parade (see Figure 5), with Ulster Television (UTV) journalist Jane 
Loughrey reporting that the mood appeared “more relaxed than in previous years.”74 
The real-time coverage provided by journalists often focused on the crash barriers, 
police personnel and vehicles that had been deployed to prevent the violence seen 
in 2012 and 2013. It was noted by one journalist that there appeared to be “more 
police than observers” as they awaited the arrival of the march.75 Newly appointed 
PSNI Chief Constable George Hamilton was one of those in attendance, as 
demonstrated by a tweet posted on his official account (@ChiefConPSNI) at 
7.48am.76 This was a precursor to the flurry of tweets that followed the passing of the 
parade through North Belfast. For example, BBC NI reporter Mark Simpson tweeted 
a picture showing one of the Ligoniel lodges as they walked past a Greater Ardoyne 
Residents’ Collective (GARC) observer, along with the text: “peaceful start to 12th 
July marches. No trouble as Orange Order parade passes Ardoyne shops”. 77 
Posted at 8.41am, this was the most retweeted post by a journalist with 77 retweets 
and 69 favorites during the period of data collection. Such was the lack of activity 
throughout the day, BBC NI journalist Kevin Sharkey would humorously tweet 
“Trouble in #ardoyne,” alongside a picture of two dogs squaring off against each 
                                                            
74 Loughrey, Jane (Jane_utv). “Although there's a heavy security presence here in Ardoyne, mood appears more 
relaxed than in previous years.” 12 July 2014, 4.58 p.m. Tweet. 
 
75 Images taken by journalist Tony Rice (@newsmantone) can be found here: http://twicsy.com/i/jEgWWf 
(accessed 10 September 2014) 
 
76 Hamilton, George (ChiefConPSNI). “After weeks of planning and engaging communities - Supt Muir Clark on 
the ground at Ardoyne - keeping people safe.” 12 July 2014, 6.48 a.m. Tweet.   
77 Simpson, Mark (@BBCMarkSimpson). “Peaceful start to 12th July marches. No trouble as Orange Order 
parade passes Ardoyne shops.” 12 July 2014, 7.41 a.m. Tweet. 
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other.78 He was one of several journalists to regularly tweet pictures from potential 
flashpoints such as the Ardoyne shop fronts during the day.  
 
Figure 4: Most frequently occurring words in Ardoyne sample (11-14 July 2014). 
 
 
 
Journalists such as the News Letter Political Correspondent Sam McBride also 
provided text-only updates on breaking news, such as the failure of GARC to obtain 
legal aid that would enable them to mount a legal challenge against the morning 
parade. Unlike the Twelfth hashtags, there were some signs that journalists were 
being challenged on their reporting of the day’s events. News outlets such as the 
BBC and UTV were heavily criticised by loyalists for reporting that the traditional 
route of the parade went through Ardoyne rather than past the shop fronts on the 
Crumlin Road. This led to some heated back-and-forth arguments between a 
number of loyalists and a few users who nominally identified themselves as 
republicans. In one such exchange, a tweeter accused the “pan-unionist front” of 
lying about the route of the parade and repeated the media claims that it passed 
numerous Catholic homes. 
                                                            
78 Sharkey, Kevin (tv_KevinSharkey). “Trouble in #ardoyne.” 12 July 2014, 7.53 p.m. Tweet.  
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The vast majority of original tweets in the sample expressed support for all those 
who had contributed to the morning parade passing off without incident. It would be 
reasonable to presume that many of these users were also responsible for 
retweeting the journalistic content discussed above. The few politicians who 
commented on Ardoyne expressed similar sentiments, albeit for different reasons. 
North Belfast Sinn Fein MLA Gerry Kelly tweeted “hopes for calm day grows” on the 
morning (9.48am) of the Twelfth, noting that it had been the quietest Eleventh night 
in years and that the morning parade has passed off “without trouble.”79 His party 
colleague Carál Ní Chuilín MLA tweeted her “huge respect” for the Ardoyne, Oldpark 
and Cliftonville youth workers who engaged young people in sports and diversionary 
activities in the run up to the Twelfth.80 Although no tweets from ‘frontline’ unionist 
politicians were found during the period of data collection, unionist political 
representatives such as DUP Councillor Nigel Kells used the micro-blogging site to 
express their support for the “graduated response” and to call for the Ardoyne 
residents to show greater tolerance of unionist and loyalist culture. Such content was 
often tagged #letthemhome, a direct reference to the Ligoniel Orange lodges that 
had yet to complete the return leg of the parade that began in July 2013. One 
interpretation of this finding might be that these political representatives were 
continuing to perpetrate zero-sum perceptions of space and politics, praising their 
respective constituents while criticising the intransigence of the ‘other’ community. 
However, the same cannot be said for those members of the public who used Twitter 
to praise both the nationalist residents and the Orange Order for keeping their 
respective protests peaceful. Self-styled parody group Loyalists Against Democracy 
(L.A.D) conveyed this sentiment in a tweet that not only congratulated “all 
concerned” for the peaceful morning parade but used an appropriate hashtag, 
namely #compromise.81   
                                                            
79 Kelly, Gerry (GerryKellyMLA). “The quietest 11th night in years and the morning parade passed Ardoyne, 
Mountainview and the Dales without trouble. Hope for calm day grows.” 12 July 2014, 8.48 a.m. Tweet. 
 
80 Ní Chuilín, Carál (caralnichuilin).  “Huge respect for Ardoyne, Oldpark & Cliftonville Youth Providers supporting 
sport & diversionary activities for youth over past week  #Meas.”12 July 2014, 8.04 p.m. Tweet. 
 
81 L.A.D. (LADFLEG).” This morning at Ardoyne the  @OrangeOrder proved that there is no need for a return 
parade. #Compromise  Well done to all concerned.” 12 July 2014, 7.37 a.m. Tweet. 
58 
 
 
Little rational debate about the Ardoyne impasse as Loyalists and Republicans 
accuse each other of bigotry and intolerance  
A small minority of users appeared to be using Twitter to blame the ‘other’ side for 
the Ardoyne dispute, with little sign of rational debate about how to resolve it. There 
were proportionately more tweets in the Ardoyne sample that attacked or mocked 
the ‘other’ community than had been found in the Twelfth hashtags. This tended to 
revolve around crude stereotypes of groups and political leaders, rather than specific 
individuals, except for a few notable exceptions such as one loyalist woman who was 
identified as being responsible for sharing a sectarian image on Facebook. For 
example, the hashtag #rerroutetheflute featured in two tweets that mocked the 
Orange Order and its supporters for their inability to complete the return leg of the 
Ligoniel lodges via the Crumlin Road. Their ‘graduated response’ was also mocked 
in one meme posted on Twitter, which showed a picture of the Orange Order and 
unionist politicians at its launch, alongside the caption “The Last Supper.”  Loyalists 
were characterised as a “sectarian hate mob,” emasculated by the Parades 
Commission and lacking the “muscle” to force their way past the Ardoyne shops. 
One tweeter went as far as to declare that loyalism was “finished,” citing the rerouted 
parades in Garvaghy Road, Lower Ormeau and Ardoyne over the past two decades 
as evidence of their decline. Few praised the Orange Order for the role they played 
in ensuring the morning parade passed off without incident. Indeed, one of these 
tweeters predicted that it would likely “kick off” during the return parade later that 
evening and suggested that the morning parade should also be rerouted away from 
the Ardoyne shops.  
These tweeters often highlighted the sectarianism of the marchers as the reason for 
their continued opposition to the contentious parade. YouTube footage of the 
violence seen in July 2013 was held up as evidence of the “sectarian hatred” that the 
nationalist residents had been subjected to as a result of this controversial parade. 
Pictures also circulated on Twitter showing that the names of several dead UVF 
members featured on the drum and banner of the POA flute band. The Orange 
Order was accused of “glorifying terrorism” through their decision to allow this 
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particular band to lead the North Belfast parade. One of these tweets was directly 
addressed to BBC journalist Mark Simpson, presumably to bring this to the attention 
of the BBC and the other professional journalists who were reporting on the parade. 
Members and supporters of the Orange Order were quick to respond to this criticism. 
One tweeter pointed out that this drum skin was used during a memorial parade and 
that it would likely be changed before the Ardoyne parade due to the Parades 
Commission determination. A different narrative on this issue emerged from the 
unverified Twitter account of a member of the POA. This user tweeted that the band 
was “proud” to display the four names on their uniform and flags.  
Several users provided links to a YouTube video of the GARC press conference on 
the 10th July, during which they outlined their strategy to seek a legal injunction that 
would ban the outward parade. Local blogger Ardoyne Republican 
(@RepublicanUnity) also identified the “militarisation” of the Greater Ardoyne 
community as one of the primary reasons why GARC continued to oppose 
“unwelcome marches,” such as those of the Ligoniel Orange lodges.82 No specific 
examples were given of this ‘militarisation’ but it is reasonable to presume that it 
referred to the heavy police presence in the area during the Twelfth each year. 
Contrary to the consensus view that the morning parade had passed off without 
incident, he also confirmed that several breaches of the Parades Commission 
determination would be reported to the relevant authorities83 The United Protestant 
Voice (@unitedprotestan) responded to this tweet by asking Ardoyne Republican for 
evidence of these breaches and accusing GARC of participating in an unlawful 
protest against the contentious march.84 The study also found some evidence of 
hostile exchanges that had taken place between the republican blogger and the 
West Belfast Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG) a few days earlier. During the 
conversation on the 7th July, the former described the latter as the “supporters of 
UDA fascists” in response to their claims that the Ardoyne residents were being held 
                                                            
82 Ardoyne Republican (RepublicanUnity). “Militarising the Greater Ardoyne community has and continues to be 
one of key reasons why GARC oppose unwelcome marches though our area!” 12 July 2014, 6.14 p.m. Tweet. 
 
83 Ardoyne Republican (RepublicanUnity). “GARC Activists, Residents and Independent Observers logged a 
number of breaches of determintion during this morning's march through Ardoyne.”12 July 2014, 2.42 p.m. 
Tweet. 
 
84 U.P.V. (Unitedprotestan). “ @RepublicanUnity breaches ? For instance ? Did these breaches involve an 
unlawful protest by Garc ? ” 12 July 2014, 3.49 p.m. Tweet. 
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to ransom by “deviant republicans”.85 This prompted another user to respond that 
both factions in Ardoyne appeared to hate each other, which was typical of the 
interactions between loyalist and republicans that were found in the sample. 
However, it should be noted that these were few in number and most tweets did not 
directly address other users in this way. 
Loyalists also appeared to be using Twitter to express their solidarity with the 
Ligoniel lodges. One tweet on behalf of the POA, thanking their supporters for their 
support, would be retweeted 13 times on the evening of the 12th July. The hashtag 
#letthemhome was commonly used in conjunction with such tweets of support for 
these lodges. Like their republican counterparts, they also used microblogging to 
blame other groups for the Ardoyne impasse. For instance, the Parades Commission 
were criticised for supposedly rewarding the republican violence in July 2012 by 
rerouting the return parade away from the Ardoyne shops. The PSNI were also 
accused of facilitating “unlawful” GARC demonstrations against the parade on the 
morning of the Twelfth. However, it was the republican movement that inevitably 
bore the brunt of loyalist anger on Twitter during this period. The rerouted parade 
was said to be further evidence of republican bigotry and their intolerance towards 
unionist and loyalist culture. This was perhaps best illustrated by a tweet posted by 
the West Belfast UPRG, in which they asked “Sinn Fein/IRA” what it was about the 
parade that they despised.86 It was therefore perhaps no surprise that there was 
much glee amongst these cyber loyalists when news broke of GARC’s failed bid for 
legal aid on the 11th July. PUP representative for South Antrim Scott McDowell urged 
his followers to “enjoy their day” after the bid by a “very bitter GARC member” had 
been rejected by the high court.87  
Loyalists also used Twitter to share eyewitness perspectives on events as they 
unfolded. These included a picture of a sign posted on a lamppost which stated 
                                                            
85  Ardoyne Republican (RepublicanUnity).”@WestBelfastUPRG More bullshite from the supporter of UDA 
fascists! ” 7 July 2014, 8.57 p.m. Tweet. 
 
86 West Belfast UPRG (WestBelfastUPRG). “GERRY KELLY, SINN FEIN/IRA, PLEASE TELL THE WORLD 
WHAT EXACTLY IS IT YOU DESPISE ABOUT THE OO PARADE WHICH PASSES ARDOYNE ???” 10 July 
2014, 9.58 p.m. Tweet. 
 
87 PUP-mcdowell, scott (scottieboy32). “THE HIGH COURT BID BY A VERY BITTER GARC MEMBER TO STOP 
TOMORROW'S MORNING PARADE PAST ARDOYNE HAS FAILED !!!!!!!!! NOW LET'S ENJOY OUR DAY.” 11 
July 2014, 4.14 p.m. Tweet. 
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“Take the hint, take the alternative route” and a picture of a “republican camera man” 
trying to find a fault with the parade as it passed the Ardoyne shops. Much of this 
user-generated content focused on the “unlawful” GARC protest at the Ardoyne 
shops. One seemingly sarcastic tweet, which featured an image of a large crowd 
gathering at the North Belfast interface, noted a large crowd of republicans that had 
gathered there even though all the shops were shut. The West Belfast UPRG would 
post a picture of the same scene 45 minutes later, albeit from a different vantage 
point. This tweet described GARC as “dissident filth” that were engaging in an illegal 
protest within the “PC sterile zone” of the shop fronts, the latter presumably a 
reference to the Parades Commission determination.88 Few of these tweets named 
individuals within GARC, with the exception of two tweets that mocked its 
spokesperson Dee Fennell. One of these sarcastically urged Fennell to take the 
“alternative route” to the GARC protest, while the other questioned whether Fennell 
and his colleagues would protest over the Glenbryn bonfire, which in the attached 
picture was shown to have an anti-GARC banner placed on top of it. Like their 
nationalist and republican counterparts, loyalists appeared more likely to use Twitter 
to criticise groups, rather than individuals, who they perceived to be responsible for 
the Ardoyne parade dispute.  
There were of course some loyalists who felt that the ‘graduated response’ did not 
go far enough. This vocal minority used Twitter to call for stronger action to be taken 
by the Orange Order and its supporters in order to overturn the Parades Commission 
determination on the return parade. One user proposed that loyalists should boycott 
the businesses that belonged to family members of the Parades Commission. Others 
argued that the fact that the parade had been rerouted in the aftermath of rioting by 
Ardoyne residents in July 2012 showed that violence, rather than peaceful protest, 
was more likely to generate results.  Hence, one tweeter urged the Ligoniel lodges to 
ignore the wishes of the Ardoyne residents and to “plough on up” the Crumlin Road. 
However, it should be noted that very few of these tweets used sectarian language 
to describe GARC and the nationalist residents. Those that did use such language 
often endorsed loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Defence Association 
                                                            
88 West Belfast UPRG (WestBelfastUPRG). “GARC DISSIDENT FILTH HOLDING AN ILLEGAL PROTEST 
WITHIN THE PC STERILE ZONE AT ARDOYNE SHOPFRONTS  #SHAREDSPACE.” 12 July 2014, 7.46 a.m. 
Tweet. 
 
62 
 
(UDA) and were hashtagged #nosurrender. Clearly, it was impossible to tell whether 
these tweeters were actually affiliated with these organisations. The absence of 
contextual information, as well as the appropriation of loyalist tropes by L.A.D, meant 
that no generalisations could be made about the attitudes of those who used such 
language.  
Twitter users move quickly to debunk rumours and misinformation 
Rumours in the Ardoyne sample appeared to have a short life span. There was 
some evidence to suggest that both loyalists and republicans were checking the 
veracity of claims made by each other on the microblogging site. Loyalists were 
accused of digitally altering pictures in order to portray GARC and the nationalist 
residents in a negative light. A picture of one of the protesters that had gathered 
outside the Ardoyne shops began to circulate on Twitter shortly after 7.30pm on 12th 
July. The placard being held aloft by the protester contained a mock-up road sign 
indicating that the Orange Order was not welcome in the area. One tweeter 
suggested that this was evidence of the intolerance of republicans and highlighted 
the fact that the Ardoyne shops were closed, presumably a reference to the unlawful 
nature of the GARC protests against the march. Twitter users immediately appeared 
sceptical of the authenticity of this image. Visual evidence suggesting that this was a 
photoshopped image was shared on Twitter within a few minutes of this tweet being 
posted. The original image showed that the protester was involved in a peaceful 
Christian protest at the shop fronts. His placard contained the motto “love Thy 
Neighbour,” not the anti-Orange Order slogan that had featured in the doctored 
image. This was corroborated by an image of the same scene taken by BBC NI 
journalist Kevin Sharkey a few hours earlier and shared on the microblogging site. 
Many users were prompted to tweet the Twitter user responsible for the sharing the 
photoshopped image accusing them of spreading lies about what was happening on 
the ground at Ardoyne. It was perhaps no surprise that the number of retweets of the 
altered image declined significantly after this revelation.   
 
Loyalists also reacted angrily to “Republican lies” about not only the route of the 
contentious parade but also an alleged attack by Protestants on a Kilkeel chapel. 
They also responded quickly to online rumours suggesting that an image of Oscar 
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Knox, the five year old who had died of a rare form of childhood cancer, had been 
burnt on an Eleventh night bonfire in Randalstown, County Antrim. 89  A picture 
supposedly showing the bonfire began to circulate on Twitter late on 11th July, 
prompting many angry responses from Twitter users. The Orange Order was the 
subject of many sectarian and abusive tweets that questioned how this could be 
considered a legitimate expression of loyalist culture. Some tweeters speculated that 
it might have been due to Knox’s Catholic background, with Irish tricolours and 
stolen statues of the Virgin Mary having already been seen on Eleventh night 
bonfires. These rumours were quickly refuted and condemned by unionist and 
loyalists on Twitter. The Ulster Unionist representative Bill Manwaring tweeted that 
those spreading “lies” about the bonfire were the “lowest of the low.”90 Loyalists also 
used Twitter to ‘name and shame’ two accounts that they believed to be responsible 
for starting these rumours. However, it should be noted that it was not possible to 
verify their claims, particularly given that one of these accounts was closed down in 
the early hours of 12th July.  
Many of these users shared visual evidence showing that the image had been 
photoshopped. The Randalstown Sons of Ulster Flute band uploaded a picture of 
their Eleventh night bonfire to their Twitter account (@RandalstownSOU) at 12.39 
am on 12th July. The accompanying text asked people to retweet the image, 
confirming that no image of Oscar Knox had been burnt and stating that the five year 
old “was a hero,”91 This was the most heavily retweeted in the sample, with 380 
retweets and 93 favourites during the period of data collection. Further evidence that 
the image of Oscar Knox had been digitally inserted into the picture emerged later 
that evening. One tweet provided a link to the original image of the bonfire that had 
been taken by photographer Stephen Barnes in July 2013.92 The image of Knox that 
had caused so much anger amongst Twitter users a few hours earlier was noticeably 
                                                            
89 For an example of one of the blogs that referred to the alleged burning of the image of Oscar Knox on an 11th 
night bonfire, see: https://beingweirdlyawesome.wordpress.com/2014/07/12/horrible-people-everywhere/ 
(accessed 10 October 2014) 
90 Manwaring, Bill (billmanwaring). “Those who started lies about Oscar Knox pictures burnt on a bonfire are the 
lowest of the low  #OscarWasAHero please RT.” 12 July 2014, 12.02 a.m. Tweet. 
 
91 Randalstown SOU (RandalstownSOU). “If everyone could retweet this and confirm! There was no Oscar Knox 
memorabilia/flags or objects on Randalstown bonfire. Oscar was a hero!” 12 July 2014, 12.30 a.m. Tweet. 
 
92 The original image taken by Stephen Barnes can be found here: 
http://www.demotix.com/news/2246569/protestants-prepare-11th-night-bonfires-northern-ireland#media-2246528 
(accessed 10 October 2014) 
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absent from this picture. Loyalists who challenged those repeating the Knox rumour 
throughout the night would refer to both these images. It was noticeable that the 
number of tweets that referred to the Knox incident sharply declined after this visual 
evidence began to circulate online. As had been seen with the image of the 
protester, Twitter provided a platform for both sides to correct misinformation and 
rumours that had the potential to increase the sectarian tensions surrounding the 
Ardoyne impasse.  
Conclusion 
The quietest Twelfth in recent years was illustrated by the family-friendly images 
shared on Twitter between 11th and 14th July 2014. The Orange Order, and its 
supporters, highlighted the positive experiences of those who attended these 
parades through the innovative use of hashtags such as #twelthieselfie. The users 
that contributed to these hashtags tended to be full of praise for the peaceful and 
non-violent conduct of the Orange Order. In particular, there was much support for 
its ‘graduated response’ to the Parade Commission’s decision to ban the return leg 
of the Ligoniel Orange lodges from passing by the Ardoyne shops. That is not to say 
that there was much evidence of cross-community consensus emerging on the 
legitimacy of parades and related protests. Rather, zero-sum perceptions of issues 
such as the disputed Ardoyne parade continued to be expressed by a small but 
vocal minority of Twitter users during this period. Some users attempted to hijack the 
Twelfth hashtags in order to criticise the Orange institution and to depict its members 
as sectarian bigots. There were also many cyber loyalists who peddled crude 
stereotypes of the GARC and the Ardoyne residents, accusing republicans of being 
intolerant towards unionist and loyalist culture. What was perhaps surprising was 
that so few of these tweets used sectarian language in their attacks on members of 
the ‘other’ community. However, the limitations in the sampling strategy outlined 
earlier might partly explain this finding. It is also feasible that some users may have 
deleted or removed offensive content shortly after it had been posted, therefore 
making it unavailable to the researcher.  
Much of the Twitter activity during this period focused on the ongoing dispute over 
the controversial return leg of the Ardoyne parade. Loyalists and republicans 
articulated competing narratives on contentious issues such as the route of the 
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parade, the Parades Commission determination, and what constituted ‘lawful protest’ 
during this period. With a few notable exceptions, there was very little debate 
between loyalists and republicans on these polarising issues. In this way, Twitter 
appeared to reinforce the zero-sum perceptions of politics held by rival groups, which 
was congruent with the findings of a previous study of the website strategies of 
Northern Irish political groups.93 However, Twitter might not be the most appropriate 
platform to facilitate rational debate about contentious issues such as the Ardoyne 
parade dispute. The complexities of such issues are unlikely to be explored through 
the exchange of messages that are restricted to just 140 characters.  
A related concern would be the representativeness of the Twitter users who engage 
in such online debates.  Recent research by the Pew Internet and American Life 
Project has suggested that social media perpetuates the “spiral of silence,” whereby 
people only speak in public about certain policy issues if they believe that their views 
are shared by others.94 Therefore, generalisations about the attitudes of loyalists and 
republicans cannot be made based upon the themes that emerge from tweets that 
address controversial issues, such as the Parades Commission decision to ban the 
return leg of the Orange Order parade from passing by the Ardoyne shops. Future 
research should consider how such events are mediated on Facebook, identified as 
a key organisational platform for the union flag protests, as well as other media 
channels that afford users more space in which to express their opinions.  
Twitter arguably functioned as a newswire during the Twelfth; allowing members of 
the public to follow events, such as the morning parade in North Belfast, in real-time. 
Although there was no equivalent of the ”crowdsourced newswire” that emerged via 
NPR editor Andy Carvin’s Twitter account during the ‘Arab Spring,’ Twitter did 
provide users with an array of information sources courtesy of the citizen and 
professional journalists who were tweeting their perspectives on events as they 
unfolded. 95  The study suggested that the latter were more influential in these 
information flows, primarily due to the high number of retweets for content produced 
                                                            
93 P.Reilly. Framing the Troubles Online: Northern Irish groups and website strategy, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2011), 
94 K. Hampton, L. Rainie, W. Lu, W.,M.Dwyer,I Shin, & K. Purcell (2014). “Social Media and the ‘Spiral of Silence.’ Pew 
Research Center, Washington, DC.Available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/08/26/social-media-and-the-
spiral-of-silence/  (accessed 10 October 2014) 
95 B.Stelter, Twitter feed evolves into a news wire, New York Times, 13 February 2011. Available at: 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/twitter-feed-evolves-into-a-news-wire-about-egypt/?_r=0  (accessed 10 
October 2014) 
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by journalists from BBC NI and UTV. Such coverage often revealed that very little 
was happening on the ground, as demonstrated by the large number of images that 
were shared showing police personnel and members of the public standing at the 
Crumlin Road interface. Citizens were quick to check the veracity of the reports 
emerging from the scene. The results also suggest that loyalists were using Twitter 
to challenge what they perceived to be inaccurate or misleading reports by 
professional journalists, such as those that discussed the traditional route taken by 
the Ligoniel lodges in North Belfast. There were also several examples of citizens 
using the site to refute rumours and expose those responsible for photoshopping 
images, as was seen with the Randalstown bonfire and the picture of a protester in 
Ardoyne. The relatively short lifespan of these rumours, not to mention the lack of 
media coverage they received, illustrated how effectively tweeters corrected 
misinformation during this period. While acknowledging that social media has often 
been used to reinforce divisions between rival communities in Northern Ireland, this 
study suggested Twitter facilitates modes of communication that have the potential 
to diffuse sectarian tensions around the marching season.  
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